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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Thesis
This paper seeks to demonstrate the existence in American law of a doctrine
of "abuse of rights," a term of French origin. This doctrine has been widely
adopted in Civil Law countries. The United States has developed a similar
doctrine, substantially separate,' from its Civil Law analogue. This development
in American law has not been recognized by American scholars and lawyers,
1. In Louisiana, the doctrine has not followed as independent a development. Various references to
Louisiana law are made in the text below.
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although many of its individual segments are well-known. English-language
literature on the doctrine is sparse,2 and normally concludes that there is no
doctrine in the common law that is similar or comparable to the French-invented
doctrine of abuse of rights, although there may be sporadic similarity of results.
Sometimes this absence is stated with a note of regret,3 other times with a
congratulatory flourish,4 and sometimes with an analysis purporting to explain
why the common law needs no such doctrine5 The scope and shape of the
doctrine varies from country to country, but a good restatement can be found in
the new Civil Code of the Netherlands, effective as of January 1, 1992:6
2. A partial bibliography includes the following: COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND
EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS: THE PRINCIPLE AND ITS PRESENT DAY APPLICATION (PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINE-
TEENTH COLLOQUY ON EUROPEAN LAW) (1990); David Angus, Comment, Abuse of Rights in Contractual
Matters in the Province of Quebec, 8 McGILL L.J. 150 (1962); Vera Bolg6r, Abuse of Rights in France,
Germany and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine, 35 LA. L. REV. 1015 (1975); Chris
J.H. Brunner, Abuse of Rights in Dutch Law, 37 LA. L.'REv. 729 (1977); Pierre Catala & John A. Weir, Delict
and Torts: A Study in Parallel II, 38 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1964); John H. Crabb, The French Concept of Abuse
of Rights, 6 INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Julio Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965 (1975);
Valerian E. Greaves, The Social-Economic Purpose of Private Rights: Section I of the Soviet Civil Code, A
Comparative Study of Soviet and Non-Communist Law, 12 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1934); H.C. Gutteridge, Abuse
of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 22 (1933); E.L: Johnson, Abuse of Rights in Soviet Civil Law, 1 THE SOLIC. 322
(1962); Albert Mayrand, Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 993 (1974); Glenda Moreland
Redmann, Abuse of Rights: An Overview of the Historical Evolution and the Current Application in Louisiana
Contracts, 32 Loy. L. REV. 946 (1987); Richard O'Sullivan, Abuse of Rights, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 61
(1955); Kazuaki Sono & Yasuhiro Fujioka, The Role of the Abuse of Right Doctrine in Japan, 35 LA. L. REV.
1037 (1975); Andr6 Tunc, The French Concept ofabus de droit, 1981 THE CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 151; David
A. Ward et al., The Business Purpose Test andAbuse of Rights, BRIT. TAX REV. 68 (1985); David A. Ward &
Maurice C. Cullity, Abuse of Rights and the Business Purpose Test as Applied to Taxing Statutes, 29
CANADIAN TAX J. 451 (1981); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Liability for Abuse of Right: Something Old,
Something New..., 54 LA. L. REV. 1173 (1994).
3. See RUDOLFB. SCHLESINGERETAL., COMPARATIVELAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 760 n.6 (5th
ed. 1988) (noting American analogues t6 particular decisions in civil law countries, but lamenting that the
pertinent American "rules appear to be enshrined in separate, seemingly air-tight compartments").
4. See Johnson, supra note 2; O'Sullivan, supra note 2.
5. Catala & Weir, supra note 2, at 237. There is less need for the doctrine in common law systems
because rights are not defined as "generously" as in civil law systems. Id. See Anna De Vita, Report, Abuse
of Rights in Housing law, in ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS, supra note 2, at 128, 131 ("To
start with, the concept of abuse only becomes necessary if rights are defined too generously. If from the start
the contents of these rights are subject to qualifications and clarifications the idea may be quite superfluous.
This is effectively what happens in common law systems .. "); Ward et al., supra note 2.
6. NEw NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE PATRIMONIAL LAW: PROPERTY OBLIGATIONS AND SPECIAL
CONTRACTS (P.P.C. Haanappel & Ejan Mackaay trans. 1990); see Brunner, supra note 2, at 738 (discussing
this section in draft form). As is the case with restatements in general, Civil Law countries are by no means
in accord with one another with respect to the scope of the doctrine of abuse of rights. Id.
Recent statutory formulations of the doctrine include Luxemburg's, which was enacted in 1987 as Article
6-1 of its Civil Code. It reads as follows:
Any deliberate act which manifestly exceeds, by its purpose or by the circumstances in which it is
carried out, the normal exercise of a right shall not be protected by the law, shall incur the liability
of the person responsible and may constitute grounds for action to restrain him from persisting in
the said abuse.
Georges Margue, Abuse of Rights and Luxembourg Law, in ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS,
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1. The holder of a right may not exercise it to the extent that it is
abused.
2. Instances of abuse of right are the exercise of a right with the sole
intention of harming another or for a purpose other than for which
it was granted; or the exercise of a right where its holder could not
reasonably have decided to exercise it, given the disproportion
between the interest to exercise the right and the harm caused
thereby.
3. The nature of the right can be such that it cannot be abused.
An English scholar, H.C. Gutteridge, surveying the common law in 1933,
concluded that there was no comparable doctrine in the Anglo-American legal
system.7 However, apart from some casual footnote references to American law,
the article was about English law rather than Anglo-American law. His summary
is encapsulated succinctly: "Our law has not hesitated to place the seal of its
approval upon a theory of the extent of individual rights which can only be
described as the consecration of the spirit of unrestricted egoism."8 As to English
law, he appears to have been right, but as to American law, he was off the mark.
It is the thesis of this paper that such a doctrine exists in American law and is
employed under such labels as nuisance, duress, good faith, economic waste,
public policy, misuse of copyright and patent rights, lack of business purpose in
tax law, extortion, and others. It is also the thesis of this article that the lack of an
overt recognition of a doctrine of "abuse of rights" creates injustices in cases not
falling within one of these doctrines.
B. Historical Background
1. England
In Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles,9 decided in 1895, a landowner sank wells
in order to diminish the community's water supply. Why did he take this action?
According to Lord Macnaghten, "it may be taken that [the] real object was to
supra note 2, at 56.
7. Gutteridge, supra note 2. at 42.
8. Id. at 22.
9. [1895] App. Cas. 587.
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[show] that he was master of the situation, and to force the [waterworks]
corporation to buy him out at a price satisfactory to himself."' 0 -It was held that
there was no cause of action. As explained most clearly by Lord Macnaghten:
He may be churlish, selfish, and grasping. His conduct may seem
shocking to a moral philosopher.... But the real answer to the claim of
the corporation is that in such a case motives are immaterial. It is the act,
not the motive for the act, that must be regarded. If the act, apart from the
motive, gives rise merely to damage without legal injury, the motive,
however reprehensible it may be, will not supply the element."
Lord Halsbury agreed, stating: "If it was a lawful act, however ill the motive
might be, he had a right to do it. If it was an unlawful act, however good his
motive might be, he would have no right to do it.'
12
Several years later, in Allen v. Flood,t3 the House of Lords essentially
declared that a contract could be a license for cruelty and wickedness. Forty
unionized boilermakers were in the employ of the Glengall Iron Company,
repairing a ship. The plaintiffs were two at-will employees engaged by Glengall
as shipwrights to repair woodwork on the same ship. The boilermakers learned
that the plaintiffs had recently been doing ironwork for another firm, a task they
deemed within the exclusive jurisdiction of their union. Some of the boilermakers
were planning a wildcat strike to protest the presence of the plaintiffs at their job
site. Allen, the boilermakers' union delegate, dissuaded them from walking off
the job impetuously, but threatened the Glengall Company that the union would
call a strike if the Company did not fire the two shipwrights. The Company
capitulated and dismissed the shipwrights who then sued Allen for tortiously
interfering with their contracts of employment. In ruling that the plaintiffs had no
cause of action, the House of Lords dwelt on the fact that the plaintiffs were mere
at-will employees who had no right to continued employment; therefore, there
was no right with which to interfere. 14 The fact that Allen, the union delegate,
10. Id. at 600. Under modem American law, the defendant would be guilty of attempted extortion.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (1962).
11. Mayor of Bradford, [1895] App. Cas. at 601.
12. Id. at 594.
13. [1898] App. Cas. 1.
14. The opinions of the Law Lords and the advisory opinions of the judges of the High Court
equivocate as to the nature of the contract of hiring. They accepted the testimony of the employer that the
workers were free to quit at will. Under ideas of mutuality of obligation.then prevailing, this meant that the
employer was free to discharge the workers at will. Some of the opinions entertained the notion that the hiring
was for the duration of the project. See id.
Lord Halsbury, dissenting, agreed, for the sake of argument, that the hiring was at will, and adopted as
his own language from Baron Bramwell that the right interfered with was the "liberty of a man's mind and will,
to say how he should bestow himself, and his means, his talents and his industry... :' Id. at 73.
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acted with the purpose of injuring the shipwrights was immaterial. Lord Wills
stated that:
[A]ny right given by contract may be exercised as against the giver by
the person to whom it is granted, no matter how wicked, cruel or mean
the motive may be which determines the enforcement of the right. It is
hardly too much to say that some of the most cruel things that come
under the notice of a judge are mere exercises of a right given by
15contract ....
Lord Watson agreed and reasoned that "the existence of a bad motive, in the case
of an act which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a civil wrong
for which reparation is due."' 6 Not all the judges agreed with this proposition.
Three of the nine Law Lords dissented. Eight judges-all of the judges of the
High Court-were summoned to attend the arguments and to give their advisory
opinions to the Law Lords. 17 Six of the eight advised the Lords to affirm the
judgment for the plaintiffs that had been entered by the trial court and which had
been affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Judge Hawkins of the High Court best
articulated a dissenting theory of abuse of rights in the following language in his
advisory opinion:
There are, however, some acts the quality and character of which may be
either rightful or wrongful, having regard to the motives with which they
are done. Take, for instance, an act which is privileged when done bona
fide in the exercise of a right to do it on a particular occasion, and
precisely similar act done on a similar occasion, but not in the bona fide
exercise of the right, but mala fide in the abuse of it, for the purpose of
injuring another under the cloak or false pretence of using a privilege. In
the first case the act would be rightful, in the latter wrongful. Wrongful,
not because it was a malicious use of the privilege, but because as the
person doing it was not using his privilege at all his action was as
unconnected with it as though it had no existence. 8
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id. at 92.
17. The case, which had grave implications for trade unionism, was highly charged with political
overtones, although the reader cannot discern this from the opinions of the judges and the Law Lords. A
scholar writes: "At this point,... [Lord] Halsbury summonedall the High Court judges to advise the House-a
remarkable medieval throwback that had little justification and only one precedent since the appearance of
Lords of Appeal in 1877." ROBERT STEvENS, LAW AND POLrrICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY,
1800-1976, at 93 (1978).
18. Allen, [1898] App. Cas. at 19.
1995 lAbuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept
Hawkins' dictum does not represent the law of England. A standard English
treatise affirms that the decisions in Mayor of Bradford and Allen, on the issue of
malevolence, state the current general rule in England. t9 Hawkins' dictum is,
however, consistent with the law of France and of the United States.
2. France
The doctrine of abuse of rights had its origin in 1855 in what might be termed
a spite-fence case.20 The facts had an elegant Alsatian twist in that the offending
structure was not a fence, but a tall dummy chimney built for the spiteful purpose
of blocking the light of a neighbor by casting a shadow over some of the
neighbor's windows. In ordering the owner to demolish the chimney, the court
had to contend with Article 544 of the French Civil Code which provides:
"Ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute
manner, provided that use is not made of them which is prohibited by laws or
regulations."' Since no law or regulation barred the owner from this kind of
construction, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man as well as the Civil
Code seemingly prohibited court interference with the exercise of property
rights,2 the court's statutory authority to order the demolition of the chimney was
doubtful.23 Nevertheless, the court ordered its demolition, holding that the
exercise of a right malevolently and without a legitimate interest was an abuse of
the right.
A case much like Mayor of Bradford v. Pickle? had arisen in France in
1846.2s The owner of a spring that produced marketable mineral water installed
a powerful pump that extracted far more water than the owner could market or
19. W.V.H. ROGERSETAL, ONTORT49 (1984).
20. Judgment of May 2, 1855, Cour d'appel, Colmar, 1856 Recueil Periodique et Critique [D.P.] 119
(Fr.). There were Roman and Medieval precedents for such a doctrine. See Joseph Voyame et al., Abuse of
Rights in Comparative Law, in ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS, supra note 2, at 25-28. A
favorite of the literature is the 1577 judgment in Aix against working men who burst into song in order to
annoy a neighboring lawyer. Id. at 26; see id. (citing BONIFACE, ARRtrS DE PROVENCE, Volume III, Book 11,
Section 1, Chapter 11, and E.H. Perreau, Origines et dveloppement de la thiorie de I'abus de droit, in REVUE
G mtRALE DE DROrr, DE LA LGISLATION ET DE LA JURISPRUDENCE 481,488 (1913)).
21. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 544 (John H. Crabb, trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1977) (1976) (Fr.)
(promulgated in 1804) (emphasis added).
22. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
23. But see O'Sullivan, supra note 2, at 61 (finding the basis for the court's decision in Article 1382
of the French Civil Code). The Code provides: "Any act whatever of [an individual] which causes [injury] to
another obliges [the one owing to whom it has occurred to make up for it]." C. Civ., art. 1382 (John H. Crabb,
trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1977) (1976) (Fr.). This Article and four others constitute the statutory basis
for the French law of torts. It seems that not all French commentators are in accord with tying the doctrine of
abuse of rights to Article 1382. See Voyame et al., supra note 20, at 32.
24. [1895] App. Cas. 587.
25. Judgment of April 18, 1856, Cours d'appel, Lyons, 1856 Recueil Periodique et Critique [D.P.] 11
199 (Fr.).
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use. The surplus was wasted and had the effect of diminishing a neighbor's
production by two-thirds. The offending owner was ordered to reduce production.
This order was made despite the text of Article 641 of the French Civil Code
which then read: "He who possesses a spring within his field may make use of it
at his pleasure .... ."26 Once again, a right declared by statute to be absolute was
held to be abused where it was exercised for an improper purpose.
3. The United States
The early American cases were in accord with the two decisions of the House
of Lords discussed above. In Jenkins v. Fowler,27 the defendant had a fence that
had the practical effect of keeping the cattle of others from the plaintiffs
wheatfields. For reasons that were found by the jury to be malicious, defendant
removed part of that fence. Cattle entered the plaintiff's property destroying the
crop. The trial court charged the jury that if the defendant removed the fence with
"malice, or with the wicked and wanton intent to do the plaintiff an injury," they
could find for the plaintiff.2' In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that "we cannot take cognisance of mere feelings and motives. These consider-
ations may and do often aggravate the character of wrongs. Malicious motives
make a bad act worse; but they cannot make that wrong which, in its own
essence, is lawful."29
This was the prevailing view until the tide began to turn in 1888 with the
Michigan decision in Burke v. Smith,30 a typical spite-fence case. The defendant
had built a fence for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of light and air to
plaintiff's downstairs windows. The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff
to abate the fence as a nuisance. The majority opinion relied on moral law and a
quote from a civil law authority, without citation or other identification of the
source,31 and said,
26. C. crv., art. 641 (A Barrister of the Inner Temple, trans.) (photo. reprint 1960) (1804). Article 641,
now renumbered 642, was amended in 1898 to add a final limiting clause on the provision. "One who has a
spring on his [property] may always use the waters of it as he wishes within the limits and for the needs of his
[tenement]." C. civ., art. 642 (John H. Crabb trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1977) (1976) (Fr.). Other
restrictions are also contained in the Article.
The author of a Canadian casenote urges that the abuse of rights notion be adopted in Canada for such
cases. Ronald D. Lunau, Note, Abuse of Rights of Ownership of Land: A New Tort?. 13 OtrAWA L. REv. 417,
425(1981).
27. 24 Pa. 308 (1855).
28. Jenkins, 24 Pa. at310.
29. Id.
30. 37 N.W. 838 (Mich. 1888); see also Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117, 120 (1836)
(dictum) (noting that a plaintiff who has a property interest in water may have an action against a person who
knowingly and willfully deprives her of her property).
31. Burke, 37 N.W. at 841.The court also relied on dicta in Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164, 172 (1882),
in which the allegation was that the defendant had maliciously diverted water that had flowed to the plaintiff's
spring. The actual holding was that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of malice, but the court
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[t]he [civil] law furnishes redress, because the injury is malicious and
unjustifiable. The moral law imposes upon every man the duty of doing
unto others as he would that they should do unto him; and the common
law ought to, and in my opinion does, require him to so use his own
privileges and property as not to injure the rights of others maliciously,
and without necessity.
32
The dissent relied on common law and civil law authorities as well, but none from
the civil law as recent as the French court's adoption of a rule of abuse of rights.
One of the two dissenting judges noted that the spite-fence problem had been met
by legislation in a number of states and asserted that the legislature was the
appropriate body to determine if such fences should be regulated or outlawed
3
In 1905, Harvard Law School Dean James Barr Ames surveyed the spite
fence and malicious diversion of water cases and concluded:
[I]n England it seems to be settled that the owner may act in this
malevolent manner with impunity. In France and Germany the owner is
liable in tort in each case. In this country there is a strange inconsistency
in the reported decisions. In thirteen of the fifteen jurisdictions in which
the question has arisen the courts have declared that the malevolent
draining of a neighbor's spring is a tort. On the other hand in six of the
ten states in which actions have been brought for the malevolent erection
of a spite fence, the opinion of the court was against the plaintiff.
That the conduct of the defendants in these cases is unconscionable
no one will deny. That they should be forced to make reparation to their
victims, unless paramount reasons of public policy forbid, would seem
equally clear. But the absence of such reasons is evident from the fact
that in France and Germany and so many of our states the courts have
allowed reparation, and from the further fact that in at least six states
statutes have been passed making the erection of spite fences a tort. 4
stated that "[o]ne of the legal rights of every one in a civilized community would seem to be security in the
possession of his property and privileges against purely wanton and needless attacks from those whose hostility
he may have in some way incurred."
32. Burke, 37 N.W. at 839-40.
33. Id. at 845 (Champlin, J., dissenting).
34. . B. Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV.
L. REV. 411,414-15 (1905) (citations omitted); see also J. B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97,
111 (1908) (noting the various approaches courts took to address the issue of liability when an individual
constructs a spite fence that interferes with a neighbor's view and urging courts to uniformly allow relief based
upon principles of equity).
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Since the decision in Burke, the courts have largely agreed that the erection of a
structure for the purpose of depriving a neighbor of light and air is a nuisance;
thus, it is unwise to build a spite fence almost anywhere in the United States
today.35 If one has an uncontrollable urge to erect such a structure, however,
Missouri appears to be a safe haven.36
There are malevolent uses of property other than the erection of spite fences
and the diversion of water: Towering blades are erected on a scaffold to deter
balloon overflights in France;37 windmills are constructed in the Netherlands to
block a neighbor's river view;38 a tower is erected to deter overflight of planes to
the airport at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania;39 and dry holes are unplugged in a
Louisiana oilfield. ° These examples are but to name but a few of the more
egregious abuses of property rights. It is clear enough that under the abuse of
rights concept of the Civil Law, and under American notions of nuisance, such
35. See, e.g., Norton v. Randolph, 58 So. 283,285-86 (Ala. 1912); Brittingham v. Robertson, 280 A.2d
741 (Del. 1971); Hornsby v. Smith, 13 S.E.2d 20,24 (Ga. 1941); Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785,787
(Idaho 1973); Wilson v. Irwin, 138 S.W. 373, 374 (Ky. 1911); Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507, 512 (La. Ct.
App. 1935); Flaherty v. Moran, 45 N.W. 381,381-82 (Mich. 1890); Bush v. Mockett, 145 N.W. 1001, 1002
(Neb. 1914); Saperstein v. Berman, 195 N.Y.S. 1, 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922); Welsh v. Todd, 133 S.E.2d 171, 173
(N.C. 1963); Barger v. Barringer, 66 S.E. 439, 440 (N.C. 1909); Hibbard v. Halliday, 158 P. 1158, 1160 (Okla.
1916); Racich v. Mastrovich, 273 N.W. 660, 663 (S.D. 1937); Schork v. Epperson, 287 P.2d 467, 470-71
(Wyo. 1955); Erickson v. Hudson, 249 P.2d 523,532 (Wyo. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 829
(1979). See also Piccirilli v. Groccia, 327 A.2d 834 (R.I. 1974) (stating that damages for the denial of right to
air and light is not recognized but an injunction is available).
36. Old adages never die. In 44 Plaza, Inc. v. Gray-Pac Land Co., the court stated: "Missouri courts
have not adopted § 829 of the Restatement [(Second) of Torts] nor the underlying rationale that malice can
convert a lawful act into a nuisance." 845 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Mo.App. 1992).
37. Judgment of August 3, 1915, Cour de cassation, [D.P.] 179 (Fr.).
38. See Brunner, supra note 2, at 736-37 (describing the case of Stolk v. Van der Goes:
[The case] arose out of a dispute between neighbors over a foot path. Stolk was denied its use by
Van der Goes. In order to show to Van der Goes that an amicable settlement was to be preferred,
Stolk erected high poles with rags on his land, which spoilt the fine view Van der Goes had from
his terrace over the river Maas. Van der Goes obtained an injunction from the court ordering Stolk
to remove the poles, as they served no useful purpose and had been erected with the exclusive
intention to harm Van der Goes. Stolk removed them, but then built a huge water tower on the same
spot. However, the tower, consisting of a water reservoir and an American windmill, was not
connected to the water supply system nor to a well, so Van der Goes obtained a new injunction for
its removal, since the building of the tower was still considered to be an abuse of right. Its removal
was ordered by the court 'as long as it cannot function properly.' Stolk did not remove it, but
connected it to the water supply system, claiming that it now served a useful purpose of watering
his greenery....
[T]he Hoge Raad [the Netherlands' Supreme Court] upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeal, which had reconsidered the matter and had found that the tower, although connected to the
water supply system, did not serve any useful purpose to Stolk and had been built with the
exclusive intention to harm Van der Goes.).
39. Commonwealth v. Von Bestecki, 30 Pa. D. & C. 137 (1937).
40. See Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 2 So. 206,212 (La. 1919) (noting that a dry hole
can reduce the flow of hydrocarbons in neighboring wells that pierce the underlying common reservoir, and
recognizing that plugging a dry hole is inexpensive; thus, failure to plug such a well is an abuse of rights and
the oil company that was responsible had abused its property rights).
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malevolent use of property rights will generally not be permitted in most of the
United States or most Civil Law countries.
It is not only the malevolent use of property rights that American law forbids.
A classic case is that of a banker who opened a barber shop in a small town for
the allegedly "wicked, malicious" purpose of driving the town barber out of
business and out of town.4 t Also, roughly contemporaneously with Allen v.
Flood,42 cases in the United States reached conclusions contrary. to that reached
in the House of Lords. Both in the context of labor union organization43 and
outside that context,44 at-will employees have been granted causes of action for
malicious interference with their employment.
I. ABUSE OF RIGHTS THEORY
The term "abuse of rights," as a matter of pure semantic logic, is an
oxymoron. If an action is penalized by law, then logically the action is not the
exercise of a right. Nevertheless, the term is in common currency and has taken
on a meaning that can be defined. When a right that is generally considered
absolute, or subject to defined limitations, is used in an inequitable fashion within
those defined limitations, the use is a wrong. Three kinds of abusive actions are
condemned by the doctrine: (1) the predominant motive for the action is to cause
harm; (2) the exercise is totally unreasonable given the lack of any legitimate
interest in the exercise of the right and its exercise harms another; and (3) the
right is exercised for a purpose other than that for which it exists.
Many aspects of our law have evolved since our separation from England.
The separation took place in the era of the Enlightenment. One aspect of
41. Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 946 (Minn. 1909).
42. [1898] App. Cas. I; see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
43. See Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' & Trimmers' Assem. No. 7507,26 A. 505, 509 (Md. 1893) (finding
that a non-union employee dismissed due to pressure from the labor union may have a cause of action if the
dismissal was done in a violent or malicious manner).
44. See Moran v. Dunphy, 59 N.E. 125, 126 (Mass. 1901) (stating that:
We apprehend that there is no longer any difficulty in recognizing that a right to be protected from
malicious interference may be incident to a right arising out of a contract, although a contract, so
far as performance is concerned, imposes a duty only on the promisor. Again, in the case of a
contract of employment, even when the employment is at will, the fact that the employer is free
from liability for discharging the plaintiffdoes not carry with it immunity to the defendant who has
controlled the employer's action to the plaintiff's harm.).
See also Jones v. Leslie, 112 P. 81, 83 (Wash. 1910) (taking issue with the decision of the House of Lords
in Allen v. Flood, and finding that an employee had a cause of action where, upon the employee's giving notice
to the employer of his intent to take a better position, the employer responded by threatening the new employer
which resulted in the employee's loss of the new position).
45. A noted French critic of this terminology, wrote, "[t]his new doctrine is based entirely on language
insufficiently studied; its formula 'abusive use of rights' is a logomachy, for if I use my right, my act is licit;
and when it is illicit it is because I exceed my right and act without right, injuria... "'2 MARCEL PLANIOL,
TREATISE ON THE CiviL LAw 871 (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959) (1939). He preferred the term "abusive acts."
Id. at 872.
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Enlightenment thinking was the firmly held belief in the existence of rights that
are absolute. Article IV of The French Declaration of the Rights of Man provides
the strong evidence of this thinking. It provides that "[t]he exercise of the natural
rights of each man, has no other limits than those which are necessary to secure
to every other man the free exercise of these same rights; and these limits are
determinable only by law." (emphasis added). The same theme is sounded in
Article V of the Declaration: "[W]hat is not prohibited by the law should not be
hindered; nor should anyone be compelled to that which the law does not
require." Article XVII is more specific as to property, stating, "[t]he right to
property being inviolable and sacred, no one ought to be deprived of it, except in
cases of evident public necessity, legally ascertained, and on condition of a
previous just indemnity."46 While these provisions of the Declaration recognize
that rights may be curtailed by the state, they are premised on the notion that once
rights are defined by the state, no judge, administrator, or fellow citizen may
curtail them.
We find even stronger evidence of the reverence for rights as absolutes in the
writings of Immanuel Kant. One passage suffices: "Equity-a dumb goddess who
cannot claim a hearing of Right... and a Judge cannot give a decree on the basis
of vague or indefinite conditions. Hence it follows, that a COURT of EQUITY
for the decision of disputed questions of Right, would involve a contradiction."
4 7
Blackstone was not immune from an absolute view of rights. "Chapter the
First" of "Book the First" of his Commentaries is entitled "OF THE ABSOLUTE
RIGHTS of INDIVIDUALS." He thus describes property: "[t]he third absolute
right, inherent in every Englishman is that of property; which consists in the free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all acquisitions without any control or diminu-
tion, save only by the laws of the land., 48 Again, while the law of the land could
curtail existing rights, no individual could. Because, in the Blackstonian scheme
of things, judges did not make law, they merely found it, only Parliament could
curtail rights.49
Since the era of the Enlightenment there has been a gradual decline in the
concept of absolute rightss° so that today hardly anyone believes in the existence
46. Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, in THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 84, 86, 110
(Easton Press 1989) (1791-1792) The Declaration itself was promulgated on August 27, 1789. A somewhat
different translation appears in Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 594, 595 (1984).
47. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSMON OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OFJURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCmNCEOFRIGHT51 (Hastie trans. 1887, 1974 reprint) (emphasis in original).
48. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134.
49. Id. at 63-64, 68-74.
50. See Paolo Grossi, Legal Absolutism and Private Law in the XIX Century, in 2 ITALIAN STUDIES IN
LAW 3, 8 (1994) (declaring that "the absolutist house of cards crudely appeared as what in large part it had
really been: an intelligent, very clever fiction .. "); see also Morris R. Cohen, On Absolutisms in Legal
Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 681 (1936) (addressing the question from a philosophical perspective).
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of such rights.5 ' Richard Epstein, however, professes such a belief when he states
that "[o]ver vast ranges of human activity, absolute rights are the indispensable
baseline against which various kinds of market transactions are conducted ....
Effective markets in land cannot function without the secure baselines guaranteed
by the absolute system of property rights at common law.",5 2 This is pretty strong
stuff-as tough as Immanuel Kant's philosophy of law. 3 In the same essay,
however, Epstein concedes "[ilt would be a mistake, however, to assume that all
disputes over property rights, even in land, should be resolved by turning to
Blackstone's regime of absolute rights." 4 He allows that in some circumstances
of disagreements between neighbors, a regime of absolute rights would be
"grotesque."55 More rigid is E. B. Watt who writes, "lt is out of place, indeed,
to call something a right if it would be impossible to observe it without
exception.,,56 "Legal ights," he asserts, "when they appear to conflict, stand in
like need of specification. If a wharf owner is not legally entitled to prevent a
vessel in distress from docking at his wharf... that does not require us to deny
that the legal rights of wharf owners are absolute. It does require us to make clear
what the extent of those rights is."57 In an ideal world that does not exist, it might
be possible to spell out ex ante the exact confines of each right.58 Prussia tried,
and failed.59 The doctrine of abuse of rights, like other doctrines, such as impos
51. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
Mary Ann Glendon is a well-known critic of the tendency for Americans to talk in terms of rights as if they
were absolute. Even those who are critical of her thesis, such as Linda McClain, endorse the notion that rights
can be overridden by other interests. See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 49 DUKE L.J. 989,
1045-49 (1994) (referring favorably to Dworkin's ideas as to the limitations on rights). Both Glendon and
McClain focus on constitutional rights, while this article concentrates on rights under private law.
52. Richard A. Epstein, Rights and "Rights Talk", 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1109 (1992) (reviewing
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)).
53. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2242 n.6
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (repeating the more famous quote from Kant on legal absolutes, that "whoever
has committed Murder, must die.... Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all
its members[,] ... the last Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried
out. This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds").
54. Epstein, supra note 52 at 1112.
55. Id.
56. E.B. Watt, Taking Rights Seriously Enough: What Kind of Rights Could Be Trumps?, 38 AM. J.
JURIS. 257, 262 (1993).
57. Id. at 259; see id. (citing Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456 (1910)).
58. Watt continues with the idea that court pronouncements "are understood to declare what the law
is, not to enact new law . I.." d. at 259. It is startling to find the expression of this naive thought in the last
decade of the twentieth century.
59. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 60 (2d
ed. 1977) (explaining that
[t]he Prussian Territorial Code of 1794 (Allgemeines Landrecht) . . .of more than nineteen
thousand paragraphs regulates all phases of social life and is not limited to private-law matters. The
code was unusual for its time in that a committee composed of administrators rather than of
representatives of the legal profession (especially law professors) prepared the draft. The legal spirit
of the time is reflected in the task assigned the drafters: It was to set out natural law in a
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sibility of performance, calls upon the Queen of goddesses, 60 Equity, to rectify the
inability of mere humans to anticipate everything that could occur in the future,
and to expend the social or transaction costs necessary to determine in advance
how those occurrences should be dealt with.
One need not adopt a communitarian ideology to favor a theory of abuse of
rights. A relational perspective is a sufficient basis. The property cases involve
neighbors who are thrust into a relationship whether they wish it or not; their
relationship stems from proximity. The civil procedure cases discussed below
involve use of the mechanisms of the state for purposes for which they were not
designed. The contract cases discussed below, involve relationships voluntarily
assumed by the parties. In the words of Emile Durkheim:
[C]ontract is, par excellence, the juridical expression of cooperation....
To cooperate, in short, is to participate in a common task.... [Contract
law] forces us to assume obligations that we have not contracted for, in
the exact sense of the word, since we have not deliberated upon them....
We cooperate because we wish to, but our voluntary cooperation creates
duties for us that we did not desire.6
Economic analysis supports this conclusion. Professors Goetz and Scott have
demonstrated that best efforts clauses and obligations of good faith in distribution
contracts have the purpose of requiring the distributor to take into account the
interests of the manufacturer as well as the distributor's own.62 What they have
demonstrated as to distribution contracts, with appropriate modifications, applies
to a vast array of contracts. As I have written elsewhere,
[A] contract establishes a relationship among the contracting parties that
goes well beyond their express promises. The promise, or group of
promises, or other bargain is fleshed out by a social matrix that includes
custom, trade usage, prior dealings of the parties, recognition of their
social and economic roles, notions of decent behavior, basic assumptions
shared, but unspoken by the parties, and other factors, most especially
including rules of law, in the context in which they find themselves 3
comprehensive and exhaustive fashion so that learned jurists would have no opportunity to exercise
their traditional skills.... Its fatal weakness proved to be the effort to deal with almost every facet
of social life in a detailed and exhaustive fashion; the resulting detail and complexity made
adaptation to changed social conditions very difficult if not impossible.).
60. Cf. supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting Immanuel Kant's description of this goddess).
61. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 123-24,214 (Free Press ed. 1964).
62. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1111-
26 (1981).
63. 1 ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACTS 10 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed., 1993).
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One of the basic assumptions underlying the contract is the unspoken thought that
the rights created by the contract will not be abused.
Primitive law is replete with examples of literal interpretation of promises
that are shocking to the conscience. As reported by Archdeacon William Paley,
one of the influential writers on law of contracts:
Timures promised the garrison of Sebastia, that, if they would surrender,
no blood should be shed. The garrison surrendered; and Temures buried
them all alive. Now Temures fulfilled the promise in one sense, and in
the sense too in which he intended it at the time; but not in the sense in
which the garrison of Sebastia actually received it, nor in the sense in
which Timures himself knew that the garrison received it: which last
sense according to our rule, was the sense he was in conscience bound to
have performed it.6
The chapter from which this passage is excerpted is the basis of "Dr. Paley's
Law," one pillar of the objective theory of contracts. In the words of one court,
"[t]he moral rule as laid down by Dr. Paley is also the accepted rule of law and
equity, as well as the law of nations: 'To give to the contract the sense in which
the person making the promise believed the other party to have accepted it."'65
The common law was much more prone in the past to indulge in literal
interpretations of contracts, even where it was rather clear that the promisor
invoked a meaning that was quite abusive and unreasonable. Centuries ago,
Justice Brook thundered from the bench: 'The party ought to direct his meaning
according to the law, and not the law according to his meaning, for if a man
should bend the law to the intent of the party, rather than the intent of the party
to the law, this would be the way to introduce barbarousness and ignorance, and
to destroy all learning and diligence. For if a man was assured that whatever word
he made use of his meaning only should be considered, he would be very careless
64. WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 99 (the 6th American,
from the 12th English ed.1810) (italics in original); see also JoHND. CALAMARI& JOSEPH M. PERLLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 8 (3d ed. 1987) ("English college students in the 18th and 19th century were exposed to
[the moral basis of contract] in the many editions of Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.
American college students received the same message from Paley or his principle American successor,
Wayland.") (footnotes omitted); cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.
2d 33, 35-37, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561,563-64 (1968) (en banc). Justice Traynor assessed the plain meaning rule as
"a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words". Id.
65. Weinstein v. Sheer, 120 A. 679,680 (NJ. 1923); see id. (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICANLAW557); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALEL.J. 939,
946 (1967) (sketching Paley's seminal role in the development of the objective theory); George E. Palmer, The
Effect of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and Reformation Under the Restatement of Contracts
Second, 65 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1966). Paley in turn was likely influenced by David Hume. See DAVID HUME,
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 523-26 (Selby Bigge ed. 1888) (1739-40).
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about the choice of his words."' 6 Systems other than the common law have a
similar history in that the primitive starting point is literal interpretation without
regard to intent.67
Modem cases generally eschew literal interpretation or construction where
the result would be abusive, but there are regrettable exceptions. Certain of these
cases are discussed in subsequent segments of this paper. How does abuse of
rights theory apply to the interpretation or construction of contract rights? Abuse
of rights theory originated in the refusal to give literal application to statutory
language where such literal exercise of the right created by statute would allow
for a malevolent action, result in an intolerable distortion of the purpose for which
the right existed, or produce an utterly unreasonable result. The same theory is
applicable to the interpretation of contractual language.
Abuse of rights theory does not seek to do away with discrete doctrines such
as nuisance, duress and the application of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Certain concepts are ubiquitous in our legal system. Consider "estoppel,"
which appears in the law of contracts, torts, civil procedure and probably in every
other field of law. "Unjust enrichment" underlies much of the law of restitution,
but it also explains why donee beneficiaries may enforce an agreement to which
they are not privy and for which they have provided no consideration. Indeed, the
concept underlies many other contractual doctrines. In the same way, "abuse of
rights" underlies many of the topics of this paper and many, many more. It can
serve both as a free-standing concept and as the underlying rationale for the
application of doctrines to particular cases. Standard interpretative techniques,
including the application of notions of public policy, do not always adequately
deal with abuses of rights.
Im. ABUSIVE DISCHARGE OF AT-WILL EMPLOYEES
A. Classical Case Law
Until the second half of the twentieth century, at-will employees 68 were given
66. Throclmerton v. Tracy, 75 Eng. Rep. 222,251 (K.B. 1554).
67. See Harry R. Sachse, Unconscionable Contracts, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
270, 274 (Joseph Dainow ed. 1969) (explaining that
Primitive systems of law are often characterized by their formality and rigidity. If the right form
is used, a contract may be enforced despite unfair terms or even vices of consent. This kind of
contractual security is at the cost of permitting injustice.... The movement in Roman law from
rigid contracts to consensual contracts and the development of a doctrine of good faith and judicial
inquiry into both the fact of agreement and the fairness of terms is properly considered a sign of the
maturation of Roman law.).
68. It is a commonplace default rule that, unless otherwise agreed, a hiring is at will. Current legal lore
has it that this default rule was invented by treatise-writer H.G. Wood. H.G. WOOD, LAw OF MASTER AND
SERVANT § 134 at 273 (1877). See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025, 1030
(Ariz. 1985) (en banc). Although the cases cited by Wood did not squarely support his generalization, it seems
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no protection against abusive discharges by their employers, despite the
protection they were granted against malicious intermeddlers in their employment
relations. In Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R.,69 the court coined one of the most
infamous, but frequently quoted and applied phrases in American law, stating that
employers may dismiss their at-will employees "for good cause, for no cause, or
even for cause morally wrong."70 Plaintiff operated a store in Chattanooga and
much of its trade was with the employees of the defendant railroad. For reasons
which were alleged to have been wicked and malicious, the defendant posted the
following notice on its premises: "Any employee of this company on Chattanooga
payroll who trades with L. Payne from this date will be discharged. Notify all in
your department."7'
The plaintiff storekeeper pleaded various causes of action, all of which were
dismissed. The court reasoned that there was nothing wrongful about the
defendant's threat to fire its employees
72
Perhaps typifying the extreme to which this view was taken is the Alabama
case of Comerford v. International Harvester.73 Plaintiff alleged that he had been
dismissed in retaliation for his wife's refusal to show affection to his immediate
supervisor. The court echoed early American cases when it stated that "[i]f one
does an act which is legal in itself and violates no rights of another, the fact that
this rightful act is done from bad motives or with bad intent toward the person so
injured thereby does not give the latter a right of action against the former." 74 The
court stated that its prior decision in a case involving the tort of interference with
a contract was distinguishable, but failed to explain why.
An examination of the tort case that the court distinguished may prove
profitable.75 Plaintiff was a construction worker who suffered an eye injury on the
job. No settlement was reached with the employer's insurer and plaintiff brought
suit under the workers' compensation law. The insurance adjuster issued the
employer an ultimatum. Based on the argument that "you can't keep this man on
intuitively incredible that such a widely-followed rule would be based on an author's miscitation of a few
cases. Cases on point that are earlier than Wood's treatise include: De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851);
Prund v. Zimmerman, 29 11. 269 (1862); Durgin v. Baker, 32 Me. 273 (1850); Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass.
187 (1873); Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131 (1869). See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited. 23 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 733 (1991) (containing a more in-depth treatment of the
state of the authorities); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule"
Revisited. 22 ARIz. ST. LJ. 551 (1990) (same).
69. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 137 (Tenn.
1915).
70. Id. at 519-20.
71. Id. at510.
72. Id. at 526-28.
73. 178 So. 894 (Ala. 1938).
74. Id. at 895.
75. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 89 So. 732 (Ala. 1921). See also American Surety Co.
v. Schottenbauer, 257 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1958); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 69 N.E. 526 (Ill.
1903).
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the job while he's suing you," the adjuster threatened that the insurer would
exercise a termination clause in the workers' compensation policy unless the
insured fired the plaintiff. The employer, induced by the threat, discharged the
plaintiff. As to the threat to effectuate a right to terminate the workers'
compensation policy,76 the court stated that such an exercise would be the
"unlawful use of that lawful right."77 The court here expressed a theory that I
label as a theory of "abuse of rights."78 It is dissonant with the theory expressed
by the same court in the Comerford case discussed in the preceding paragraph.
There are doubtless significant historical and policy differences between cases
involving interference with the employment relation by outsiders 9 and cases
involving employer-employee rights and duties inter se, but these differences are
not articulated in either of the two 6ases discussed here. Instead, two
irreconcilable jurisprudential outlooks on the absolute or relative nature of rights
are expressed by the same court.
B. Abuse of Rights Theory and Discharges Against Public Policy or in Bad
Faith
The absolute power to dismiss an at-will employee, 0 although frequently
questioned, was firmly backed by court decisions until the last half of the
twentieth century.81 Ingenious efforts to circumvent the rule were rarely suc
76. In Hohfeldian terms, the "right" to exercise a termination clause, is not a right, but a power.
WESLEYNEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 50-57
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed. 1964) (1919). The term "abuse of rights," as used in this paper, encompasses rights,
powers, privileges, immunities, etc.
77. Millonas, 89 So. at 735. Accord, on almost identical facts, London Guarantee, 69 N.E. at 526.
78. In Civil Law systems, the problem of abusive discharge is regulated by statutes that are interpreted
in the light of abuse of right doctrine. See, e.g., Alex Bodry, Abuse of Rights in Employment in Luxembourg
Law, in ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS, supra note 2, at 124-28; Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 1404, 1424 n.102 (1967).
79. Since the days of the Black Death, an employer has had a cause of action against anyone who
enticed away a servant. See MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AvImuCAN LAw 70-74
(1989); ROBERT STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND
AmERiCAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991).
80. There is a rebuttable presumption that a hiring is at-will. Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473
N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
81. Myriad cases could be cited. See Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App. 1934) (upholding the
termination of plaintiff who alleged he was fired from his job as a laborer in a milk plant for not voting for
certain candidates for local office). See generally Blades, supra note 78. A rare exception appeared in tie pre-
classical period of American contract law. United States v. Jarvis, 26 Fed. Cas. 587 (D. Me. 1846). In Jarvis,
the plaintiff was appointed Navy Agent in April 1838 for a term of four years, but terminable at the pleasure
of the President. He was dismissed by incoming President (Tippecanoe) Harrison on September 27, 1841. The
court held that the plaintiff was an agent, whose agency under agency law and the terms of the contract was
terminable at will. However, the court found that equity, good faith, and fair dealing required the United States
to reimburse the plaintiff for certain reliance expenses that were wasted because of the dismissal, including,
provided ajury found that such commitments were not imprudent, rent paid until the end of 1841 and salary
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cessful.8 2 What seems to have been the first break in the solid case law came in
1959, with the California case of Peterman v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 396.83 The plaintiff had been employed by the union as a
business agent. His supervisor instructed him to testify falsely to a legislative
commission. Instead, he testified truthfully. In retaliation, he was dismissed the
next day. The court ruled that a cause of action by the business agent against the
union was stated. This decision inaugurated the public policy exception to the
unfettered power of the employer to discharge an employee who was not hired
under a contract with a specific duration term. From that lonely beginning, it can
now be said that "the vast majority of states have recognized that an at-will
employee" has an action "when he or she is discharged for performing an act that
public policy would encourage or for refusing to do something that public policy
would condemn." 4 Although the employment continues to be labeled "at will,"
the use of the power to discharge, if employed to thwart the public policy of the
owed to a clerk who had been hired for a one-year term. Id.
82. See Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1952) (holding against the plaintiff
in a libel action due to insufficient publication under Alabama law). The plaintiff in Mins had been employed
for thirty-two years by the defendant in various managerial positions. He was fired, allegedly because he
declined to honor his supervisor's request to donate $1 to the presidential campaign of Senator Taft. Plaintiff
complained to Senator Sparkman who wrote to the defendant demanding an explanation. The president of
Metropolitan Life responded by claiming that the plaintiff's services had been inefficient and unsatisfactory,
and that Metropolitan Life's only mistake had been in giving the plaintiff such a long period of time to prove
himself. Id.
83. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959).
84. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992). See generally 1 ARTHUR L. CoRBIN,
CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 4.2 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed. 1993). In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,
421 N.E. 2d 876 (Ill. 1-981), an employee was discharged for providing authorities with information concerning
criminal conduct of a fellow employee. The court explains the public policy exception in this context as
follows:
Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public
policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory
discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties and
responsibilities before the tort will be allowed. Thus, actions for retaliatory discharge have been
allowed where the employee was fired for refusing to violate a statute. Examples are: for refusing
to commit perury... for refusing to engage in price fixing.., for refusing to violate a consumer
credit code.., for refusing to practice medicine without a license .... It has also been allowed
where the employee was fired for refusing to evade jury duty ... for engaging in statutorily
protected union activities ... and for filing a claim under a workers' compensation statute .... The
action has not been allowed where the worker was discharged in a dispute over a company's
internal management system ... where the worker took too much sick leave... where the worker
tried to examine the company's books in the capacity of a shareholder... where the worker
impugned the company's integrity . .. where the worker refused to be examined by a
psychological-stress evaluator... where the worker was attending night school ... or where the
worker improperly used the employer's Christmas fund. The cause of action is allowed where the
public policy is clear, but is denied where it is equally clear that only private interests are at stake.
Where the nature of the interest at stake is muddled, the courts have given conflicting answers as
to whether the protection of the tort action is available.
Id. at 878-79.
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state, is an abuse, and damages will be assessed for the abusive exercise of the
power.
In addition to the erosion of employer power by the public policy exception
(to the arbitrary power of the employer to terminate the at-will employment
contract) other cases have fashioned a "good faith" exception. In Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co.,8 5 the plaintiff, a sales representative, received a
notice of termination the day after his employer received a $5 million order that
he had procured. The parties had a written agreement that expressly provided for
an at-will duration. Plaintiff was entitled to a substantial "bonus" commission
provided he remained in defendant's employ.8 Bad faith consists of, inter alia,
the attempt to deprive the other contracting party of the fruits of the contract for
which he or she bargained,87 and the jury found that the dismissal was in bad
faith. The court held that the plaintiff had a contractual cause of action, based on
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is present in every
contract. Other cases have followed suit. The implication of a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, however, is frequently a fiction, if one views the impli-
cation as an implication of fact. Instead, the concept of abuse of rights operates
as a rule of law, restraining the employer from a misuse of power. It is a more
forthright way of explaining the abusive discharge decisions. As I have written
elsewhere, "[r]ules of basic dignity whether based on legislation or not have been
incorporated into the employment relation." Such rules are not necessarily based
on the intention of the parties. Louisiana adheres to the abusive discharge concept
rule by application of the abuse of rights concept. 9
Note that in the public policy and bad faith cases, the employer's motives
were not necessarily malevolent. Retaliation against a worker because the worker
has sued the employer or filed a workers' compensation claim is not necessarily
vengeful. It is likely to be employed as a tool to discourage other workers from
exercising their rights if they become similarly situated with the discharged
worker.90 In a case where a seaman was fired in retaliation for filing a lawsuit
against the employer under the Jones Act, the court stated: "[t]he employer's
discharge of the at-will seaman-employee, while it is in essence a lawful act,
should not be used as a means of effectuating a 'purpose ulterior to that for which
85. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
86. Id. at 1252-53.
87. See Steven I. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HARV. L. REV. 369,373 (1980) (hereinafter Burton, Breach of Contract].
88. 1 CoRmN, supra note 63, at 561.
89. See Clark v. Glidden Coatings & Resins, 666 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. La. 1987); see also infra note 209
and accompanying text (discussing the Sanborn case).
90. See Framton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (involving a worker fired for
filing a workers' compensation claim); Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) (involving facts where an employer had retaliated against an employee for filing a workers'
compensation claim and reporting safety conditions to OSHA).
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the right was designed."' 91 This language is remarkably similar to the language
of abuse of rights as it appears in the Netherlands Code provision quoted above.
92
Other language in the opinion is also suggestive of a theory of abuse of rights.
"Whether grounded in tort or contract, the cause of action is based on the notion
that the employer's conduct in discharging the employee constitutes an abuse of
the employer's absolute right to terminate the employment relationship when the
employer utilizes that right to contravene an established public policy.' 3
IV. NON-EMPLOYMENT CASES OF RETALIATION
A. Retaliatory Termination of Insurance Policies
In the discussion of at-will employment, two cases of employee discharge
based on an insurer's threat to cancel the employer's workers' compensation
policy were considered. In both cases, the insurer was held to have been guilty of
tortious interference with the employment relationship. 94 However, in L'Orange
v. Medical Protective Co.,95 the cancellation was in retaliation for the conduct of
the insured. The policy covered dental malpractice. It was terminable on two
express conditions: ten days notice and refund of the unearned premium. The
plaintiff dentist testified in a malpractice action against another dentist. There-
upon, the plaintiff's malpractice insurer gave the plaintiff ten days notice of
cancellation and a check for the unearned premium. The plaintiff brought an
action for breach of contract, alleging that the cancellation was an attempt to
intimidate him in his capacity as a witness. The trial court dismissed the action
for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the
plaintiff's contention that "the particular purpose for which the power of cancel-
lation was exercised renders the cancellation void." 96 Ohio's public policy against
intimidation, stated forcefully in its penal statutes and in its case law, prevented
abuse of the contractual power to terminate the contract. An overt concept of
abuse of rights better explains the decision than the amorphous concept of public
policy.
91. Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1062 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Blades,
supra note 78, at 1424); see also Blades, supra note 78, at 1413, 1421.
92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
93. Smith, 653 F.2d at 1062.
94. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
95. 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968).
96. Id. at 62.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
B. Retaliatory Eviction Where Tenant Asserts Rights as Tenant
A generation ago, the D.C. Circuit ruled that a tenant in an eviction pro-
ceeding could assert the defense of retaliatory eviction if the eviction proceeding
was brought in retaliation for the tenant's complaint to the authorities of the
landlord's sanitary code violations.97 The defendant in that case was a month-to-
month tenant who, under local law, was subject to eviction at the whim of the
landlord, limited only by notice and procedural protections. However, the land-
lord's decision to evict was propelled by vengeance. The ability to wreak
vengeance would foreseeably deter other tenants from reporting sanitary vio-
lations. Once again, it was held that the use of an admitted right to achieve an
improper purpose is an abuse of that right and was struck down by the court.
Many states have followed the D.C. Circuit's reasoning. Others have
accomplished the same result by finding that freedom from retaliatory eviction
inheres in the warranty of habitability. Others have reached the same result by
statutory enactment. Over the years, the defense of retaliatory eviction has been
extended to protect tenants from eviction where tenants exercise any right granted
to tenants in their capacity as tenants, such as the right to organize to protect their
rights against landlords, to petition, to make repairs and deduct their cost, etc. To
some extent these defenses have been created by case law and to some extent by
legislation.98 The disparity of reasoning in these cases can be narrowed if there
were general recognition of a doctrine of abuse of rights.99
C. Retaliatory Eviction for the Exercise of Rights Unrelated to the Tenancy
United States v. Beaty't° was an action brought by the United States under the
Civil Rights Act t01 to enjoin the defendants from using various forms of coercion
designed to deter African-American citizens of Haywood County, Tennessee,
from exercising their rights to vote for candidates for federal offices. The trial
court preliminarily granted much of the relief requested but denied any relief
against white owners of land who evicted or threatened to evict black share-
croppers as a weapon to prevent them from voting or as punishment for having
registered or votedyn2 The trial court's decision on this point was based on the
97. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687,690 (D.C. Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
98. See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.45 (1984); Annot.,
Retaliatory Eviction of Tenantfor Landlord's Violation of Law, 23 A.L.R. 5TH 140 (1994).
99. See George M. Armstrong, Jr. & John C. LaMaster, Retaliatory Eviction as Abuse of Rights: A
Civilian Approach to Landlord-Tenant Disputes, 47 LA. L. REV. 1 (1986).
100. 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
101. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c) (West 1994).
102. The trial court in Beaty reasoned as follows:
The Court has been asked to enjoin the eviction of some of the sharecroppers by certain of these
defendant landowners and to enjoin the altering of the existing sharecropping contracts which
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theory that the landlords were merely exercising or threatening to exercise their
rights to evict tenants whose tenancies had expired or were about to expire. The
Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with the mandate that the trial court hear
evidence about
any situation where a defendant-landowner evicts or threatens to evict a
negro tenant or refuses to deal in good faith with said tenant for a contin-
uation of occupancy and tenancy, and said eviction, threatened eviction
or refusal to deal in good faith is found to be for the purpose of
interfering in any way with the right of such negro tenant to become
registered or to vote in Haywood County, Tennessee, and to vote for
candidates for federal office, or as punishment for having previously
registered or voted, such conduct would constitute a violation of the
prohibitions of the order.103
Once again, we see the court restricting a right-the right to evict a tenant at the
expiration of a tenancy-usually conceived as absolute-where the right is sought
to be employed for an improper purpose.
State courts have also allowed tenants the defense of retaliatory eviction in
cases where the act which induced the eviction proceeding is remote from the
tenant's rights as a tenant. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that an eviction pro-
ceeding brought in retaliation against a group of month-to-month tenants who had
testified before a land use commission in opposition to the landlord's application
to change the classification of land from "agricultural" to "urban" uses was an
improper assertion of rights, and the defense of retaliatory eviction was available
to the tenants. 1°4 Similarly, in New Jersey, trailer-park tenants who had opposed
their landlord's application for a zoning change were given the defense of
retaliatory eviction.'05 The defense was also made available to California farm
laborers who had made a claim against their landlord under the Farm Labor
Contractor Registration Act.' °6 These evictions can be seen as a class of SLAPP
lawsuit discussed below.' °7 In each of the foregoing cases the landlord had a
property right entitling the landlord to reclaim possession, but this right was
expire the first of the year or shortly thereafter. In effect, it seems to the Court the plaintiff is asking
that the court make new rental contracts for certain of the parties in this litigation. It ought to be
evident to all that relief of this type cannot be awarded, especially on an application for a
preliminary injunction. The Congress, it is plain to see, did, in passing this Civil Rights Act, intend
to protect the voting right but it did not, as the Court reads the Statute, vest the Courts with
authority to adjudge contracts and property rights.
Beaty, 288 F.2d at 655.
103. Id. at 657-58.
104. Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 577 P.2d 326, 334 (Haw. 1978).
105. Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 312 A.2d 888, 890-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973).
106. S. P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1976).
107. See infra notes 153-163 and accompanying text.
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subordinated to the tenants' freedoms of expression and petition because the land-
lord's right was being used in an abusive way.
It has been suggested to me that the thesis that there is an unrecognized
doctrine of "abuse of rights" is not worth much if, in fact, there are sufficient
discrete doctrines such as retaliatory eviction with which the legal system can
work out just solutions. To counter this criticism, I shall bring forward cases in
which the lack of recognition of such a doctrine produces what I consider an
inequitable result. Consider the case of Imperial Colliery Co. v. Fout.0 8 The
plaintiff was a coal miner leasing a small trailer lot in tiny Burnwell, West
Virginia, from a company that was an affiliate of the family of companies that
included his employer. His tenancy was month-to-month; rental was one dollar
a year. The lessor gave plaintiff notice of termination and brought an eviction
proceeding that was allegedly triggered by the tenant's involvement with the
United Mine Workers union and its selective strike against the employer. The
court held that the retaliatory eviction defense could not be raised because "we are"
led to the conclusion that the retaliatory eviction defense must relate to activities
of the tenant incidental to the tenancy."' 9 By focusing on a narrowly drawn
doctrine of retaliatory eviction, the court did not observe that retaliation for
exercising rights granted by Congress under the N.L.R.A. is as abusive as
retaliation for rights granted by the law of landlord and tenant. In contrast, under
Louisiana law, retaliatory eviction has been treated under the general concept of
abuse of rights." °
V. THREAT TO EXERCISE A RIGHT AS DURESS
A. Abusive Civil Litigation
Countless cases have stated that a threat to do or the doing of an act that one
has a legal right to do cannot constitute duress.' A threat to bring a lawsuit is a
threat to exercise a fundamental constitutional right provided there is a good faith
basis to the asserted claim. Settlements are encouraged by the legal system and
108. 373 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1988).
109. Id. at 494.
110. Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 451 So. 2d 1229, 1231 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no
retaliatory intent and therefore no abuse); Armstrong, Jr. & LaMaster, supra note 99.
111. See John P. Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation: I, 45 MICH. L. REV. 571, 579 (1947)
[hereinafter Dawson, Duress 1] (citing twenty cases which follow the stated proposition). In the three articles
written by Professor Dawson for the Michigan Law Review, he clearly proved that in an extraordinary number
of cases relief for duress was granted where no tortious or criminal act was threatened or accomplished. See
John P. Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation: 11, 45 MICH L. REv. 679 (1947) [hereinafter Dawson,
Duress 11]; John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253 (1957).
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there is general agreement that settlements should not easily be set aside.,12
Nonetheless, if the settlement is obtained by abuse of the legal machinery of the
state or the threat of such abuse, the settlement may be voidable.
In one case a husband threatened his wife that he would bring a child-custody
battle based on her adulterous behavior unless she assigned certain securities to
him. The court held that it was a jury question whether the assignment thus
procured was voidable for duress. The court stated:
The weight of modem authority supports the rule, which we here adopt,
that the act done or threatened may be wrongful even though not
unlawful, per se; and that the threat to institute legal proceedings,
criminal or civil, which might be justifiable, per se, becomes wrongful,
within the meaning of this rule, if made with the corrupt intent to coerce
a transaction grossly unfair to the victim and not related to the subject of
such proceedings.'
3
Thus, we once again, in an entirely different context, find language consistent
with a pervasive doctrine of abuse of rights.
In Fornell v. Rashid,' 4 there was a lawsuit for corporate contr6l brought by
a shareholder, Bertril Fomell, against the corporation in which he, his wife, his
sister, and her husband held the majority of shares. The court ordered the sister
and her husband joined as defendants and plaintiff's wife joined as a plaintiff.
The defendants counter-claimed asking that Bertil be declared a spendthrift and
that Bertil's wife be appointed as guardian. This relief was granted. When Bertil
later contested the jurisdiction of the trial court to have granted such relief, the
appellate court held that the trial court had had no jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian. Although much of the reasoning concerns the relative roles of the
Michigan probate and circuit courts of general trial jurisdiction, the court goes
further and decries the vice of the use of guardianship proceedings as a tactic in
unrelated litigation among family members. The nub of this branch of the
decision is in this bit of wisdom: "By permitting a circuit court, in the exercise of
its equity jurisdiction, to determine whether a party is a spendthrift, we would
only be accentuating the opportunity for 'abuse of the machinery of the law for
the purpose of securing an unconscionable advantage.""' 5 The court also quoted
Professor Dawson to the effect that "the use of this type of remedy for the
112. See 2 ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7.17 (Joseph M. Perillo & Helen H. Bender
rev. ed. 1995) (discussing consideration in settlement agreements and expressing the need for finality in such
settlements).
113. Link v. Link, 179 S.E.2d 697, 705 (N.C. 1971).
114. 198 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. App. 1972).
115. Id. at 701; see id. (quoting Foote v. DePoy, 102 N.W. 112, 115 (Iowa 1905)).
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securing of private advantage is a misuse and diversion from its intended
purpose.""
' 16
One could cite a multitude of cases in which courts have held that the abusive
use of litigation or the threat thereof constitutes duress. To do this would be
merely to retrace the path blazed by Professor Dawson in his two-part article,
Duress Through Civil Litigation,"7 where he demonstrated "the broader con-
clusion that even threats in 'good faith' of civil litigation can become unauthori-
zed pressure, where economic disadvantage prevents effective resistance and the
terms thereby dictated are grossly unfair."' 18 He also demonstrates that "[t]hough
opinions again are divided, the cases allowing relief for duress give support for
the view that means of pressure in themselves quite legitimate can become
improper when used to exact an unjustified gain."'"19 Despite this persuasive
demonstration, we frequently encounter the old adage. It is repeated by Charles
Fried, who quotes a Texas case to the effect that "[t]here can be no duress unless
there is a threat to do some act which the party threatening has no legal right to
do.' I do not urge that the doctrine of duress be supplanted by a theory of abuse
of rights. However, abuse of rights doctrine can provide a clearer foundation for
decisions setting aside agreements induced by the abuse of litigation processes.
B. Threat to Discharge an At-Will Employee as Duress
Although, under the current majority view, an at-will employee cannot be
discharged for a bad reason, the employee can otherwise be discharged at the
pleasure of the employer. In Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 12 the plaintiffs
had been employees and shareholders of the defendant. They alleged that officers
of the employer had threatened that they would be fired unless they sold their
shares to them or to the defendant employer. Coerced by this threat, they sold the
shares to the employer at the price offered. Subsequently, they sued for rescission
of the sale and restitution of the shares. It was held that they had stated a cause
of action. 22 Once again, we see the threatened exercise of a lawful power as
116. Id. at 710-11; see id. (quoting Dawson, Duress 11, supra note 111).
117. Supra note I11.
118. Dawson, Duress 1I, supra note 111, at 695. In his two-part article, Dawson discusses the following
categories of cases: (1) injunctive relief against repeated litigation of actions already litigated (action for simple
money judgment), (2) personal (civil) arrests prior to judgment, (3) seizure of goods and appropriation of debts
prior to final judgment, (4) executions under final money judgments, (5) assertions of liens, (6) dispossessions
from real estate, (7) actions for injunctions, and (8) bankruptcies and receiverships. Various cases not quite
fitting into these categories are discussed by him throughout the article. Id.
119. Id. at 696.
120. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 151 n.10
(1981). Fried cites to another work by Dawson "for a critical discussion of this formulation of duress." See
Dawson, Economic Duress, supra note 111, at 287-88.
121. 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970).
122. Id. at 682.
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becoming unlawful when employed for a purpose other than that for which it was
designed. Other cases also indicate that a threat to fire an at-will employee
constitutes duress if it overcomes the free will of the employee.'
23
However, the lack of a generally recognized concept of abuse of rights leads
to similar statements in cases with apparently similar facts.' 24 Plaintiff sought
rescission of his release of option rights on grounds of duress and undue
influence.
What plaintiff relies upon is the fact that he was told he would be
involuntarily discharged, without severance pay and this might be dis-
closed to prospective employers. This can neither be considered a threat,
nor false advice, since defendants had the right to discharge plaintiff,
who was an employee at will, were not under any duty to continue his
salary and were privileged to inform prospective employers of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the termination of his employment. A threat to
do that which one has the legal right to do does not constitute duress or
fraud. 125
123. See, e.g., Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 42 N.W.2d 404,408 (Minn. 1950) (explaining that "[t]he
fact is that the meeting in Schindler's [the employer] office and Schindler's statement to plaintiff in effect that
he would be 'through' if this case [against his former employer] was not then settled, warranted plaintiff in
believing that Schindler would discharge him if he did not sign the release and that the Sun company was
cooperating with defendant. A threat to cause a person loss of employment may amount to duress...."). In
R.L Mitchell v. C.C. Sanitation Co., plaintiff-employee, while driving the employer's truck, was involved in
a collision allegedly the fault of the driver of defendant's vehicle. Defendant's insurer would not pay for the
damages to the employer's vehicle unless plaintiff executed a release of his personal injuries. In exchange for
reimbursement of only his out-of-pocket medical expenses, the plaintiff signed a release because the employer
had purportedly threatened to discharge him if he did not sign. The court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant. The reversal contravened many Texas decisions that stood for the
proposition that "[tjhere can be no duress unless there is a threat to do some act which the party threatening
has no legal right to do." R.L. Mitchell v. C.C. Sanitation Co., 430 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
Accord Cubbin v. Buss, 144 N.W.2d 175 (Neb. 1966). In Shurtleffv. Giller, a signed promissory note for
$60,000 was given by the employee to his supervisor who had threatened to fire him if he did not sign. The
money was owed because of an agreement with respect to a failed joint venture between the two of them.
Surprisingly, a "take-nothing judgment" was entered on an action on the note. Shurtleff v. Giller, 527 S.W.
2d 214, 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). Duress is a doctrine that generally only involves the cancellation or
disgorgement of excess gain. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 64, at § 9-8. In Perkins Oil Co. v.
Fitzgerald, the plaintiff, a young man, lost both of his arms in an on-the-job accident. The superintendent
threatened to fire plaintiff's stepfather, who was the sole support of the plaintiff's brother and invalid wife
unless he accepted a settlement offer of $5000. His acceptance was found to be under duress. Perkins Oil Co.
v. Fitzgerald, 121 S.W.2d 877, 880, 882, 885 (Ark. 1938).
124. The phrase "apparently similar facts" is chosen advisedly. In the quotation in the text and elsewhere
in the opinion, there is a suggestion that the employee had been guilty of some sort of wrongdoing. There is
also a suggestion that the plaintiff's claim, if there was one, was barred by laches. These facts may justify the
result, but do not justify the stated reasoning. Bachorik v. Allied Control Co., Inc., 312 N.Y.S.2d 272, 275
(App. Div. 1970).
125. Id. at 275.
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The refrain that constitutes the final sentence of the above quotation is belied by
many cases. As more recently stated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
"Economic duress may be found if the act is done under circumstances which are
considered wrongful even if there was a legal right to perform the threatened
act."' 26 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts includes in its catalog of acts that
could form the basis for duress: "what is threatened is otherwise use of a power
for illegitimate ends."'27 These statements express a doctrine of abuse of rights.
C. Other Examples of the Exercise of Rights as Duress
At the risk of multiplying too many examples, it may be noted that the
following have been held to be conduct that formed a predicate for duress. An
attorney who derives one-third to one-half of his income from the defendant bank
is threatened with being replaced unless he signs a note for part of the
indebtedness of a bank officer. 28 A wife abandons her husband and returns
asking permission to enter his house to retrieve her clothing and to speak to her
children; he refuses unless she signs a one-sided separation agreement. She
signs.' 29 In both of these cases the threat itself was to do or refrain from doing
what the party had a perfect right to do except that it was threatened to be
employed for a purpose other than that for which the right exists.
D. The Tort of Abuse of Process
As formulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the tort of abuse of pro-
cess is a narrowly circumscribed version of the doctrine of abuse of rights as
formulated in the Netherlands Code, quoted above.3 ° Section 682 of the
Restatement provides: "One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil,
against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is
subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process."' 3' In a
rare case in which this tort is seen in relation to other forms of abuse of rights,
Justice Ellen Peters, in holding that Connecticut would adopt the public policy
exception to the at-will hiring rule, stated "[b]y way of analogy, we have long
recognized abuse of process as a cause of action in tort whose gravamen is the
126. Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 731 P.2d 411,419 (Ol. 1986) (involving a construction
contractor who made a non-negotiable final offer to liquidate a sub-contractor's claim for extras at a time when
the subcontractor was suffering financial distress).
127. RESTATEmENT(SECOND) oFCoNTRAcrs § 176(2)(c) (1981).
128. Gerber v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 332 N.E.2d 615, 617 (III. App. Ct. 1975).
129. Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757, 759-60 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
130. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
131. RESTATEMENr(SEcoND) oFToRTs § 682 (1977).
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misuse or misapplication of process, its use 'in an improper manner or to
accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed."4
32
Because the tort is generally treated as a writ with confined boundaries, we
find this sentence in Prosser: "But it is clear that the judicial process must in some
manner be involved. A repairman's notice of a lien and sale, for example, is not
an invocation of process and cannot form the basis for an abuse of process
action."' 33 For the same reason, we find separate torts of malicious prosecution,
the treatment of which occupies 22 sections of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,134 and wrongful use of civil proceedings, the description of which occupies
ten sections. 35Throughout all three torts runs a common thread that a privilege
has been abused. An overview might reveal that the unifying thread is more
important than the differences among them.
Georgia, by court decision, has unified the torts of abuse of process and
wrongful use of civil process into one. 36 In so doing, it achieved the goals of
simplifying the nomenclature of the tortious acts,137 and eliminating the need to
clarify "[t]he substantive difference between the two torts [which] is often
difficult to discern.' 38 Perhaps, more importantly, a broadly understood tort of
abuse of the litigation process takes within its scope abusive actions that fail to
meet the precise elements of either of the pre-existing torts. 39 The tort of abuse
of process arose in England at a time when, under the writ system, the court
deemed itself powerless to expand the existing tort of malicious prosecution.
Instead, the court permitted an action on the special case to the plaintiff whose
ship's registry had been extorted from him by defendant by the bringing an action
on a debt not yet due and arranging for the plaintiff's civil arrest as an abusive
tool to obtain the registry."4° Although the writ system was abolished well over
a century ago it still remains sadly true that "the forms of action we have
abolished, but they still rule us from their graves.''
132. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387 (Conn. 1980).
133. WaLA L. PROSSER &W. PAGE KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 898 (5th ed. 1984).
134. See RESTATHaENT (SECOND) oFToRTs §§ 653-673, ch. 29 (1977).
135. Id. at ch. 30.
136. See Yost v. Torok, 344 S.E.2d 414 (Ga. 1986). In Georgia the nomenclature for the two torts is
"malicious abuse of process" and "malicious use of process." The rule laid down in Yost to the effect that the
tort action could be brought by way of counterclaim in the allegedly abusive action has been affected by
legislation, but the substance of the Yost ruling remains intact. See Block v. Brown, 404 S.E.2d 288 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1991); see also Nottingham v. Resource Materials Corp., 435 S.E.2d 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993), cert.
denied. The Yost court declined to determine whether the tort of malicious prosecution would also be merged
with the other two torts. Yost, 344 S.E.2d at 417. See generally V.S. Khanna, Abuses of the Legal Process: To
Tort or Not to Tort, 22 VICTORIA U. OF WELLINGToN L. REV. 239 (1992) (urging that New Zealand adopt the
Georgia approach).
137. See Yost, 344 S.E.2d at 416.
138. Id. at415.
139. Id. at416.
140. Grainger v. Hill, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838).
141. F.W. MAITLAND. THE FORMS OFACTION ATCOMMON LAW2 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1962) (1909).
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E. Liability Under Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that an
attorney representing a client in a federal court action must sign every pleading,
motion, or other paper. 42 It further provides that the signature of an attorney
certifies, among other things, that the document "is not being presented for any
improper purpose.' '143 Violation of the rule results in a liability for sanctions
which may include an order that damages be paid to the other party to the
litigation.
What does this rule have in common with rules of nuisance-abatement that
apply to spite fences? The rule is designed to deter vexatious and frivolous legal
actions, including law suits, motions or other court proceedings that are brought
for purposes other than to obtain the relief sought in the pleading, motion, or
other demand for relief. Fences may be built to keep animals or people within the
boundaries of one's property or to keep them out, or even for merely decorative
purposes, but the building of a fence to vex or to extort money from a neighbor
should not be tolerated in a civilized society. The same thrust is behind Rule 11,
with this difference: The liability is placed (except in pro se litigation) on the
attorney-the expert who should have knowledge of whether the client has a
colorable claim-as well as the party who retained the attorney. Rule 11 decisions
are numerous and have been the subject of exhaustive treatises."' The point is,
Rule 11 fits well within the framework of abuse of rights theory. This paper will
avoid cataloging the many Rule 11 violations that have been found to exist, but
will focus only on litigation documents filed for an improper purpose.
In Saltany v. Reagan, 45 an action was brought against the United States, the
United Kingdom, President Ronald Reagan, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
and other high officials of both governments for injuries suffered by plaintiffs as
a result of the 1986 air strike on Libya by the United States from air bases in the
United Kingdom. The District Court dismissed the complaint and commented that
plaintiffs' counsel "surely knew" that the case "offered no hope whatever of
success"' 46 but did not impose sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys. The District
Court surmised that the action was "brought as a public statement of protest of
Presidential action with which counsel and, to be sure, their clients were in
profound disagreement."' 47 The Circuit Court ruled that this statement of the
142. FED.R.CIv.P. 11.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (2d ed. 1994);
GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE I I SANCTIONs: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVEMNVE MEASURES (2d ed.
1993); see also Nestor Cruz, Abuse of Rights in Title VII Cases: The Emerging Doctrine, 67 A.B.A. J. 1472
(1981) (focusing on attorneys' fees in civil rights actions).
145. 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
146. Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.D.C. 1988).
147. Id.
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District Court was tantamount to a finding that plaintiffs' counsel were in
violation of Rule 11 and remanded for the imposition of sanctions under that rule,
stating that "[w]e do not conceive it a proper function of a federal court to serve
as a forum for 'protests,' to the detriment of parties with serious disputes waiting
to be heard.' 48 Similarly, in the case of In re Kuntsler,49 the Fourth Circuit
sustained Rule 11 sanctions largely on the basis that the law suit was filed for
improper purposes. Rule 11 itself gives examples of improper purposes: "such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the costs of the
litigation." These, the Kuntsler court rules, are not an exclusive catalog of
improper purposes. Starting a law suit with no intention to litigate the claims
made in the complaint is an abusive purpose. Here the "circumstances sur-
rounding the case.., supported the conclusion that the primary motives in filing
the complaint were to gain publicity, to embarrass state and county officials, to
gain leverage in criminal proceedings, and to intimidate those involved in the
prosecution of [their clients]." 50 Even if Rule 11 does not apply, the federal
courts have inherent power to apply sanctions to a party or the party's attorney
for bad faith complaints or other court papers filed in bad faith.15 ' State courts
also have such inherent power.152
F. SLAPP Actions and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
University of Denver Professors Penelope Canan and George Pring coined
the term "SLAPP," an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation. 53 In a typical SLAPP case, a developer applies for permits allowing
the construction of a building or the subdivision of land. Neighbors oppose the
project. The developer then sues the neighbors who have expressed opposition-
often for millions of dollars, on any number of theories, such as interference with
prospective advantage, defamation, or violation of the developer's civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Considering the high cost of legal fees and the fear of
a mistaken judgment, it frequently happens that the opposition collapses, or other
148. Saltany, 886 F.2d at 440.
149. 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Kuntsler v. Britt, 499 U.S. 969 (1991).
150. ld. at 519.
151. See Hotel St. George Assocs. v. Morgenstern, 819 F. Supp. 310, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
152. See Spremo v. Babchik, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
153. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. American Fundware, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1516, 1522 n.3 (D.
Colo. 1993) (attributing the term "SLAPP" to Professors Canan and Pring); see also Penelope Canan & George
W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative
Approaches, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 385 (1988). See generally George W. Pring & Penelope Canan,
Symposium, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation" ("SLAPPs"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar
and Bystanders, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937 (1992); Jennifer E. Sills, Comment, SLAPPs (Strategic
Lawsuits against Public Participation): How Can the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CoNN. L. REv.
547 (1993); Thomas A. Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the
Courts' Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REv. 979 (1992).
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potential opponents are deterred from expressing their thoughts publicly. As
described by one court, "SLAPP suits are characterized by an effort to punish
political opponents for past behavior, an attempt to preclude their future political
effectiveness, the desire to warn others that political opposition will be punished,
the use of the judicial system as part of an economic strategy, or some com-
bination of the above attributes. Groups targeted by SLAPP suits often lose
members, funds and political potency."' 4
The United States Supreme Court has forged a doctrine in antitrust cases
known as Noerr-Pennington'55 which since has been adapted to cope with such
abusive lawsuits in areas other than antitrust. Under this doctrine, the SLAPP
action will be dismissed because it is brought to stifle the exercise of the con-
stitutional right to petition. The neighbors who oppose a proposed development,
in the hypothetical discussed above, have an immunity from such suits brought
for an improper purpose.156 A penalty under Rule 11 or its state analogue may
also be imposed.' 7 Similarly, if the neighbors had brought an action to enjoin the
development, whether or not they were successful, they would have a certain
degree of immunity from actions against them for abuse of process.
58
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not absolute. Even First Amendment rights
to petition the government have abusive possibilities. Thus, the Supreme Court
has stated in dictum that "[a] pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge
which leads the fact finder to conclude that the administrative and judicial
processes have been abused. [A]ctions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by
154. Monia v. Parnas Corp., 278 Cal. Rptr. 426,435 (Ct. App. 1991).
155. In Eastern Rail Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the railroads had engaged in
an advertising campaign designed to curtail the use of trucks for long distance hauling of cargo. They
succeeded in having the Governor of Pennsylvania veto what was known as "The Fair Truck Bill." The
truckers sued the railroads, claiming that this conduct constituted an antitrust violation. The Supreme Court
ruled that petitioning the government could not constitute an antitrust violation. Eastern Rail Pres. Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the union successfully
petitioned the Secretary of Labor to increase the minimum wage applicable to coal miners. This had the effect
of driving some smaller coal companies out of business. It was held that the Union's petition could not
constitute an antitrust violation. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
156. See, e.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); Westfield Partners,
Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981) (reviewing a
libel action by mining company against environmental groups that allegedly libeled the company in a
newsletter and in communications to the government).
157. Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis, is a typical case. Defendants opposed plaintiff's
requested zoning permit for a nightclub. Plaintiff brought an action for tortious interference with business
relations and prima facie tort. Aside from the fact that this was a SLAPP suit, the plaintiff was unable to allege
the necessary elements for the tort claims. The court upheld the trial court's imposition of sanctions in the
amount of $10,000 and the award of attorneys' fees to each defendant. Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v.
Davis, 603 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). In Gordon v. Marrone, a developer was penalized in the sum
of $10,000, even though the retaliatory suit to contest the tax exempt status of certain Nature Conservancy
property was deemed "colorable." Gordon v. Marrone, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
158. Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court of Jefferson County, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
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seeking refuge under the umbrella of 'political expression." ' 59 Courts have
followed this limitation, known as the "sham" limitation.' 60 At least one court,
however, has followed a different notion of abuse than indicated by the Supreme
Court dictum.' 61 Several states have enacted special legislation to deal with
SLAPP suits. Common provisions among these statutes include procedures under
which such suits may be dismissed at an early stage, and compensatory and
punitive damages against the plaintiffs who have abused the processes of the
courts in a particularly brutal way and for a purpose that is inimical to the most
basic constitutional values of the Republic. 62
In perspective, a SLAPP suit can be seen as an abuse of right. The coercion
is not aimed at obtaining money or vindicating a right, but at the gaining of a
victory over a political opponent by abusing the machinery of justice. Abuse of
rights theory demonstrates the commonality between the cases of duress by civil
litigation discussed earlier in this paper and the SLAPP suit. 63
VI. BAD FAITH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT
A. The Idea of Good Faith
"Good faith" may be impossible to define in any meaningful way, even if we
limit the definition to good faith in the performance of a contract. According to
Professor Robert Summers, the term is an "'excluder,'-it is a phrase which has
no general meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude many
heterogeneous forms of bad faith."'6 According to Judge Posner, "the term [has
159. California Motor Transp., Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
160. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1991); Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. American Fundware, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Colo. 1993); Protect Our Mountain
Env't, Inc., 677 P.2d at 1361.
161. Florida Fern Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam County, 616 So. 2d 562 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see id. (distancing its analysis from the Supreme Court dictum, in favor of a test of
whether a privilege has been abused). Apparently, under this test, a malicious invocation of the right to petition
would give rise to a Noerr-Pennington defense or cause of action. Id. The Florida Fern Growers court also
distanced itself from Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), which had noted that malice is
easier to plead and prove than "sham." Id. at 565-67. Such distancing may not be permitted if Noerr-
Pennington is rooted in the United States Constitution. But see Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication
of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1984)
(suggesting that the doctrine is not so rooted).
162. See generally John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPS,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395 (1993); Edward W. McBride, Jr., Note, The Empire State SLAPPS Back: New York's
Legislative Response to SLAPP Suits, 17 VT. L. REv. 925 (1993).
163. See supra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
164. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good Faith]; see also
Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 810, 818-21 (1982) [hereinafter Summers, The General Duty].
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no] settled meaning in law generally; it is a chameleon." 65 Those who believe the
idea of good faith is adequately defined as "honesty in fact in the ... trans-
action"' may be astonished by the definition of good faith in the law of warfare:
Absolute good faith with the enemy must be observed as a rule of
conduct; but this does not prevent measures such as using spies and
secret agents, encouraging defection or insurrection among the enemy
civilian population, corrupting enemy civilians or soldiers by bribes, or
inducing the enemy's soldiers to desert, surrender or rebel. In general, a
belligerent may resort to those measures for mystifying or misleading the
enemy against which the enemy ought to take measures to protect
itself.1
67
Professor Burton has expressed a unitary theory of good faith performance
with respect to contracts which is un-chameleon-like.168 "Good faith perfor-
mance," he states, "occurs when a party's discretion is exercised for any purpose
within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to
capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract, interpreted
objectively."' 69 Conversely, bad faith performance involves an attempt to capture
opportunities that were forgone at the time of contracting. While it is doubtful
whether this definition captures the universe of good and bad faith conduct in the
performance of a contract,170 this bad faith definition captures those in which a
165. Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries, Inc., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988).
166. U.C.C. § 1-201(19). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts did not adopt the U.C.C. definitions,
but instead adopted Professor Summers' excluder analysis. See RESTATE,ENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 205
cmt. a (1979); Summers, The General Duty, supra note 164, at 820.
167. DEPARTMENT OFTHE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARu A 22 (1956).
168. Professor Burton does not purport to define "good faith" in his article; rather, he limits his
discussion to "good faith in performance." See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 87, at 372 n.17.
169. Id. at 373, 380; see id. (asserting that courts explicitly raise the implied covenant of good faith or
interpret the contract in the light of good faith performance only in those case where one party has discretion
in performance or there is an omission in the contract); see also Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The
World of Contract, 75 IOWA L. REV. 861, 868 (1990) (stating that "[sluch discretion does not exist when the
contract provides, for example, that the buyer will pay a fixed price on delivery for a fixed quantity of goods
to be delivered at a specified place on a specific date."). It should be noted, however, that even here the buyer
has discretion to accept or reject a tender that is non-conforming. Such a rejection can be held to be in bad faith
if the discretion is exercised because of a falling market price rather than serious concern about the non-
conformity. See Oil Country Specialist, Ltd. v. Phillip Bros., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1988); see
also Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreat'l, Inc., 825 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that
cancellation for breach would, if merely a pretextual reason, violate the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing). Such conduct by the buyer, however, appears to come under the concept of good faith in enforcement
rather than good faith performance.
170. See, e.g., Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 146 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that
Sharon Steel practiced abundant bad faith in performance, not by abusing any discretion, but by deceptive and
coercive tactics). Professor Gergen accepts Burton's analysis, but supplements it with two other kinds of bad
faith. The first of these, lack of "conformity with customary norms of behavior," (citing to U.C.C. § 2-103(b))
seems to be subsumed in Burton's formulation. The second is an economic rationale: "Good faith forbids a
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party's discretionary power is abused so as to deprive the other party of his or her
reasonable expectations.
B. Bad Faith Exercise of Discretion
An illustrative case is Pillois v. Billingsley,7 1 where in a letter agreement
regarding the plaintiff's services to be rendered in procuring an exclusive
representation and trademark from a French perfume house, the plaintiff agreed
that "[m]y compensation for such services as I may render in this connection shall
be such sum as you, in your sole judgment, may decide is reasonable."' 72 The
services were rendered. Defendant ratified the contract negotiated by the plaintiff
despite his displeasure with its terms. Defendant set no value on the services and
the court held that the defendant's obligation was to fix a value on the services in
good faith, and its failure to do so created a right of action by the plaintiff in
quantum meruit. While analysis in terms of good faith produces a satisfactory
result,173 a further analysis in terms of the principal's abuse of his power to deter-
mine compensation separates this kind of case from its chameleon-like cousins
in the universe of good faith.
In Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Anderson,174 the issue as framed
by the court was "the question of whether good faith is a prerequisite in the
exercise of an absolute discretion to withhold incentive compensation."' 75 The
plaintiff had been a sales representative of the defendant under a contract
containing detailed formulas for the computation of incentive compensation. 76
He resigned'7 and requested payment of the deferred incentive earned under the
contract. The employer, giving no reason, refused. In court, it relied on language
in the contract to the effect that such payment to terminated employees "will rest
completely in the absolute and final discretion of the Compensation Committee
party from acting to harm the parties' joint interest in matters left open by the contract." Mark Gergen, A
Cautionary Tale About Contractual Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1235, 1264 (1994).
171. 179 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1950).
172. Id. at 207. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Validity of Contract which Leaves Amount to be Paid
in Performance Thereof to Promisor's Determination, 92 A.L.R. 1391, 1396-1412 (1931); see also Sprik v.
Regents of Univ. of Mich., 204 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 210 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. 1973). In
Sprik, the University's lease with married students permitted the University to make unilateral changes in the
rent. None of the judges contested the validity of such a reservation of power by the University. The dissent,
however, thought that the power had been abused. Id. at 72.
173. Modem law recognizes that a unilateral power to determine price or compensation must be
exercised in good faith. See California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 289 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1955).
This proposition is now codified by U.C.C. § 2-305.
174. 257 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 1979).
175. Id. at 28.
176. The contract terms are quoted at length in the opinion of the intermediate appellate court. Anderson
v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America, 248 S.E.2d 507, 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).
177. This fact is not mentioned by the Georgia Supreme Court, but instead appears in the intermediate
court's opinion. Id. at 508.
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of the Board of Directors."1 78 Based on this language, the trial court awarded
summary judgment to the defendant.
The intermediate court reversed, saying that the defendant's good faith pre-
sented a factual issue. The Supreme Court, reinstating the judgment of the trial
court, held that the presence or absence of good faith was irrelevant. Absolute
discretion means, says the Court, absolute discretion. The Court would not imply
a term to the effect that "our discretion will be exercised in good faith," but
seemingly found an implicit term that "our discretion may be exercised in bad
faith." Some, but not all, courts have disagreed with this case on the meaning of
the term "absolute discretion."' 79 As one court stated ninety years ago, "[ilf one
party to a contract has the unrestrained power to say what it means, the other has
no right except by sufferance.., and human language is not strong enough to
place them in that situation."'
80
If a concept of abuse of rights were generally adopted, the discussion would
be conducted under a different framework. A court would ask, what is the pur-
pose of awarding incentive compensation? If it is designed to instill employee
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(standing for the proposition that there is "absolute discretion" in contractual negotiations, and stating the
general rule that there is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract "subject to the exception
that the parties may, by express provisions of the contract, grant the right to engage in the very acts and
conduct which would otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").
But see U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (providing "that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care
prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement."); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (concluding that "[fiiring for bad cause-one against
public policy articulated by constitutional, statutory, or decisional law-is not a right inherent in the at-will
contract, or in any other contract, even if expressly provided.") (emphasis added); A.W. Fiur Co., v. Ataka &
Co., 422 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (App. Div. 1979) (noting that "[a]lthough the contract conferred upon [Ataka]
America the 'absolute right to reject any orders for any reason whatsoever,' such a contract does not import
the right arbitrarily to refuse to accept orders."). If one deems that a bad faith action is against public policy,
the quoted phrase from Wagenseller, supra, is applicable to the kind of case under discussion. In Newmac/Bud
Light Team Bass Circuit, Inc. v. Swint, the court held that a fishing-contest rule which provided that all
interpretations of rules and final decisions would rest with the tournament director was not a potestative
condition because the director had a duty to exercise sound judgment in interpreting the rules and to award
prizes to those catching the most poundage offish. A potestative condition is one that is entirely within the
control of a party; a finding that it was such a condition would invalidate the contract on grounds similar to
the common law notion of an illusory promise. Newmac/Bud Light Team Bass Circuit, Inc. v. Swint, 486 So.
2d 255, 256 (La. Ct. App. 1986). See Martin v. Prier Brass Mfg. Co., 710 S.W.2d 466, 473 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that an employer had the right to terminate the insurance plan, but it was in bad faith to
terminate without notice). In Richard Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co., the plaintiff, an underwriter, had the
power to terminate, "if prior to the effective date the Underwriter, in its absolute discretion, shall determine
that market conditions or the prospects of the public offering are such as to make it undesirable or inadvisable
to make or continue the public offering hereunder." It was argued that the agreement was not binding because
the underwriter's promise was illusory. The court disagreed, saying: "[t]he term 'absolute discretion' must be
interpreted in context and means under these circumstances a discretion based upon fair dealing and good
faith-a reasonable discretion." Richard Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505-06 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1963). See also Seymour Grean & Co. v. Grean, 82 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
180. Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 73 N.E. 7, 9 (N.Y. 1905).
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loyalty and act as an incentive for the employee's remaining with the company
and to work harder at his assigned tasks, the result reached by the court would be
appropriate.1 If, instead, it is designed to withhold earnings until the project is
completed and paid for, abuse of rights analysis would conclude that the dis-
cretion had been abused.1
82
Justice Scalia engaged in much of this kind of reasoning when sitting on a
similar case on the D.C. Circuit. In Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell,'83 the employer,
Tymshare, was empowered to retain a portion of the sales representatives'
earnings in a reserve fund. The earnings were calculated in part based on a sales
quota assigned to each of the representatives. The quota could be raised or
lowered from time to time and "management reserves the right to change...
individual quota and reserve payments at any time during the quota year within
their sole discretion."'' 4 Covell argued that a retroactive increase in his quota at
the time of his termination was in bad faith. The employer urged that "sole
discretion" precluded inquiry into its motives. Scalia stated that the phrase was
"not necessarily the equivalent of 'for any reason whatsoever, no matter how
arbitrary or unreasonable."' The trial court had found that the employer had
breached the contract by manipulating the quota plan. As understood by the
Circuit Court, this meant the trial court found "that in using its quota adjustment
authority (combined with its termination authority) to reduce Covell's compen-
sation, Tymshare was not acting for any of the purposes implicitly envisioned by
the contract.... [W]e agree that this would be a proper basis for judgment against
Tymshare." A theory of abuse of rights was employed.
As Scalia states, "even the permissible act performed in bad faith is a breach
only because acts in bad faith are not permitted under the contract.' ' 85 This
sentence is framed in the language of abuse of rights. The trial court was given
a mandate to inquire into the purposes for which the employer retroactively raised
Covell's quota at the time of the termination of his employment. If it was done
to deprive him of his earned compensation, it was in bad faith and he was entitled
181. In Walker v. American Optical Corp., American's sales incentive plan promised bonuses to
employees exceeding a certain quota provided they were still working for American at the time of distribution.
Walker far exceeded his quota, but voluntarily left American before distribution. He sued for his bonus. The
court affirmed a judgment for American, reasoning that an employer's duty to pay a bonus which is subject
to a condition precedent of performance arises only when the condition is fulfilled. Here, the purpose of the
plan was to secure the continued services of employees producing high levels of sales. The promise of a bonus
helps advance that purpose, as does the denial of a bonus to an employee who leaves the company. Walker v.
American Optical Corp., 509 P.2d 439, 441 (Or. 1973) (en banc).
182. See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 87, at 379-85; see also id.. at 385 n.74 (noting that
"[t]he purpose of the discretion exercising party is a key factor.").
183. 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
184. Id. at 1150.
185. Id. at 1150 n.3.
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to damages. This reasoning is perfectly consistent with abuse of rights analysis.1 6
Indeed, a Louisiana case, on similar facts, states that "the exercise of a right
without legitimate and serious interest, even where there is neither alleged nor
proved an intent to harm, constitutes an abuse of right which courts should not
countenance."'
8 7
C. Conditions of Satisfaction
If a contract contains a provision that a party need not pay for a performance
that is not satisfactory to him or her, a court reviewing that party's expression of
dissatisfaction, after determining that the contract does not contain a standard of
satisfaction, must first pigeon-hole the condition into one of two categories.'88 If
the performance is intended to gratify personal taste, fancy, or judgment, the
courts have limited the review of an expression of dissatisfaction to the honesty
of the party; if the dissatisfaction is eccentric, but honest, the party need not pay.
This result is based on a straight-forward interpretation of the contract and does
not engage any notion of abuse of rights.
On the other hand, where the performance involves mechanical fitness, utility
or marketability, the court reviews the party's expression of dissatisfaction
utilizing the criterion of reasonableness as well as the test of good faith."8 9 The
test of reasonableness does not necessarily reflect the intent of the parties. Rather,
it is a court-imposed standard based on the notion that, without such a con-
structive term, a party can abuse the power granted by the contract to refuse to
pay for a performance.
186. Similar reasoning is employed in Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., where an incentive
compensation plan contained an express condition that the employee be employed by the company on the date
that the payment is due. The Second Circuit remanded with instructions that the jury be charged to determine
if the defendant discharged the plaintiff for the purpose of avoiding the payment of the incentive commissions.
Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985). See Wyss v. Inskeep, 699 P.2d 1161 (Or.
App. 1985) (stressing in a "sole discretion" case that the purpose of the bonus program was to retain key
personnel and that it had succeeded in keeping plaintiff on thejob; his dismissal and denial of a bonus were
for reasons unrelated to his performance of the job and therefore a breach of the promise of a bonus); see also
Hainline v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1250. 1255 (6th Cir. 1971) (stating in a bonus case that "discretion
may not be abused by those to whom it is entrusted...."); Holderman v. Huntington Leasing Co., 483 N.E.2d
175, 176 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (declaring that "any controversies regarding this plan shall be decided
exclusively by [employer] in its sole discretion"). But see Stinger v. Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc., 830
S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (stating in an incentive compensation case that "[the] arrangement may
be modified or changed upwards or downwards at any time at the Company's discretion," and holding that the
company had discretion to go downwards to zero).
187. Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353, 1369 (La. 1976).
188. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 64, at 503-04; 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
646 (1960); James Brook, Conditions of Personal Satisfaction in the Law of Contracts, 27 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv.
103 (1981).
189. Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, 4 N.E. 749 (N.Y. 1886) (concerning the remodemization of
a boiler); Johnson v. School Dist No. 12, 312 P.2d 591 (Or. 1957).
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D. Requirements Contracts
Other abuse of rights cases decided under the heading of good faith include
those where the core of the problem is the discretionary exercise of a right. These
include cases in which the contract gives a party the power to determine the
quantity term. In Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp.,' 90 an
electric utility entered into a contract to purchase its requirements of oil from a
refiner for a fixed period at a fixed price. The market price of oil skyrocketed.
The utility started to generate more power than usual and sold it to neighboring
utilities at prices that were cheaper than they could generate on their own. The
refiner resisted the utility's orders to the extent they exceeded historical
quantities, and successfully defended an action for breach as the utility was acting
in "bad faith."19' As to this requirements contract, the good faith obligation is
explicit in the applicable provision of the Uniform Commercial Code;192 the
obligation, however, had been developed at common law. t93 The rationale is
simple. Although on its face the contract appears to have permitted the utility to
buy all the oil its facilities could use, it was not within the contemplation of the
parties that the purchases would be for the purpose of furnishing electricity on a
wholesale basis, beyond what had been its custom, to other utilities. The
apparently absolute right to buy its requirements had been abused. This result can
be obtained by the process of contract interpretation rather than a court-imposed
doctrine of abuse of right. One of the rules of contract interpretation is designed
to deter abuses of rights. As Corbin states, "[i]f... the words of agreement can
be interpreted so that the contract will be fair and reasonable, the court will prefer
that interpretation. '194
190. 397 N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
191. Id. at 820; accord City of Lakeland v. Union Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
Homestake Mining Co. v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 476 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1979), a~fd
per curiam, 652 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1981). A requirements-contract case arising out of the same oil and gas
shortage that affected Orange & Rockland reached the conclusion that on its own facts, there was no breach
of the good faith obligation of the buyer, although the buyer purchased considerably more jet fuel pursuant to
the contract. The practice known as "fuel freighting"--filling the plane's tank at the location where the price
is most favorable-was both a trade usage and course of dealing and performance between the parties. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
192. U.C.C. § 2-306; see also American Original Corp. v. Legend, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 962, 963-64, 68
(D. Del. 1986) (applying the U.C.C. provision). The contract provided that "The American Original Cor-
poration will supply adequate cages for fishing operations." The supplier, in turn, agreed to buy the other
party's output of surf clams and quahogs up to a stated maximum. It contended that the quoted provision gave
it absolute discretion as to the number of cages it would provide. The court ruled that this provision required
American Original to supply an adequate supply of cages measured by the buyer's requirements. Id.
193. New York Central Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 66 N.E. 967 (N.Y. 1903).
194. 3 CORBi., supra note 188.
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A buyer under a requirements contract may go out of business in good faith,
thereby ceasing to have requirements. 95 However, if the requirements buyer
incorporates the business in which the product is used, and announces that the
requirements are now zero, the buyer will be liable for breach of contract. 196 The
right to go out of business has been abused and liability attaches, although from
a formal perspective no breach of the obligation to take requirements has
occurred. Once again, in another context, courts have struck down an abuse of
rights.
E. Commercial Leases
Another context where the abuse of rights has been held to violate the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is in cases of commercial leases. In Daitch
Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. Neisloss, 197 the lease expressly gave the tenant an ex-
clusive right to operate a supermarket in a shopping center. The landlord's sub-
sequent plan to build a supermarket structure on adjacent land for a competitor
of the tenant was enjoined. The court remarked that the percentage lease between
the landlord and tenant required "extreme good faith by each party, both as to the
interpretation and as to the performance of the agreement."1 98 Clearly, the
decision is not based on an interpretation of the agreement which specifically
described the boundaries of the tenant's exclusive rights. Rather, its basis is the
law-imposed duty to refrain from an abusive exercise of one's rights. The
landlord's conduct constitutes what Professor Summers calls evasion of the spirit
of the deal.' 99 From another perspective, decisions of this kind "prevent a party
from acting opportunistically-acting in a way that diminishes the parties' joint
return on a contract in order to capture a larger return for itself-under circum-
stances that the parties probably did not anticipate when drafting the contract. ' 20°
Of course, tenants as well as landlords are capable of abusing a percentage
lease. Under a percentage lease, the tenant is required to occupy the premises and
use good faith efforts to maximize revenues unless the lease provides otherwise
195. See, e.g., Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988); Angelica
Uniform Group, Inc. v. Ponderosa Systems, Inc., 636 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1980); R.A. Weaver & Assocs., Inc.
v. Asphalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1978); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d
Cir. 1966); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Imperial Prof'l Coatings, 599 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Wilson-
ville Concrete Products v. Todd Bldg. Co., 574 P.2d 1112 (Or. 1978); 1 CORBIN, supra note 84, at § 4.6.
196. See Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) oF CONTRACTS § 205 illus. 1 (1979).
197. 190 N.Y.S.2d 737 (App. Div. 1959), affd mem., 167 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1960); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 illus. 2 (1981) (using Dutch Crystal Dairies as the basis of its
illustration); Carter v. Adler, 291 P.2d 11 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Tabet v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 409 P.2d
497 (N.M. 1966).
198. Dutch Crystal Dairies, Inc., 190 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
199. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 164, at 234-35.
200. Gergen, supra note 170, at 1273.
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or provides for a substantial minimum rent.2°1 If the tenant under such a lease
ceases to do business or operates a competing operation in the immediate vicinity
of the leasehold, liability may ensue. This liability may be based on a theory of
bad faith, the doctrine of prevention, or ostensible interpretation of the contract.
In the above cases, the court's employment of the good faith rationale
produces results that are satisfactory. Why then is there a need to employ an
abuse of rights rationale? It is simply that the concept of good faith is so
multifarious as to provide little guidance to the court. Abuse of rights thinking,
although itself somewhat elastic, provides a steadier rudder. An examination of
some cases where good faith analysis failed to provide a result consistent with
civilized norms of decision may prove the point. These are reviewed in Part VII
of this paper.
VII. ABUSIVE REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF A LEASE,
DISTRIBUTORSHIP, OR FRANCHISE
A. Leases
Courts applying classical contract law hold that a lessor, franchisor, or manu-
facturer can withhold consent to an assignment of a lease, distributorship, or
franchise without any liability. Gruman v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc.202
is a typical case of abuse of landlord power. The tenant wished to vacate com-
mercial space under a lease that had a clause forbidding subletting or assignment
without the consent of the landlord. The tenant found that the post office was a
willing assignee. The landlord refused to approve the assignment. One may
speculate that a landlord may have good reason not to want the post office as a
tenant, but such speculation does not explain the conduct in this case, inasmuch
as "it was stipulated that the postmaster-general of the United States was in all
respects a highly satisfactory, desirable, and suitable subtenant .... 203 One might
speculate further as to why the landlord withheld consent. Did the landlord want
to capture an increase in rental value by dealing directly with a new tenant?m Not
201. See, e.g., Fifth Avenue Shopping Center, Inc. v. Grand Union Co., 491 F. Supp 77 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
College Block v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 179 (Ct. App. 1988); Slater v. Pearle Vision Center,
Inc., 546 A.2d 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Markets, Inc., 260 A.2d 841 (NJ.
1970); Swartz v. War Memorial Comm'n of Rochester, 267 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1966). In Stop & Shop,
Inc. v. Ganem, 200 N.E.2d 248 (Mass. 1964), the court indicated that if the tenant vacated the premises out
of "spite or to inflict harm," there would be liability, even where there was a substantial minimum rent. Id. at
253.
202. 78 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1956).
203. Id. at 379.
204. See Truschinger v. Pak, 513 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1987) (holding that a landlord's refusal to consent
to a sublease was not an abuse of right, even though the sublessee was willing to completely assume the lease).
The landlord refused to consent to the sublease unless one-half of $80,000 promised to the prior lessee from
the sublessee were to be paid to him. This was held not to be an abuse of right. The landlord's economic motive
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so. The tenant vacated the premises. The premises remained vacant and the land-
lord brought an action for rent. The court framed the issue as follows: "The only
issue is whether under the lease clause above quoted plaintiffs could arbitrarily
refuse to accept the suitable subtenant proffered by defendant." 205 It answered
with candor that the landlord can arbitrarily refuse to approve a subletting and
may arbitrarily refuse to mitigate damages. If one function of contract law is to
be in the service of the commercial economy, is a standard of "arbitrary" dis-
cretion an appropriate commercial standard?
Some courts have thought that it is not an appropriate standard. According to
the California Supreme court, "[a] growing minority of jurisdictions now hold
where a lease provides for assignment only with the prior consent of the lessor,
such consent may be withheld only where the lessor has a commercially
reasonable objection to the assignment... ." (Emphasis in original). °3 Such a
rule is consistent with an evolutionary change in other areas of contract law. Most
contracts are imbedded in a commercial context. If the naked words are stripped
from the context, their meaning is distorted. Classic contract law imposed such
distortion. Modem contract law is seriously concerned with the context of the
words.
In France, such landlord conduct is treated as an abuse of right. 207 Louisiana
is the only jurisdiction in the United States to have overtly adopted a doctrine of
abuse of rights. Its courts have stated that the refusal to consent to a sublease is
subject to the abuse of rights doctrine, holding, however, on the facts of the cases
that there had been no abuses. 0 8
A non-lease Louisiana case illustrates the utility of the abuse of rights
doctrine. In Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,2 9 the plaintiff had worked for
the defendant Oceanic in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. Some months after
the employment terminated, plaintiff was offered a job in Dubai with Scimitar,
another employer. The immigration regulations in the Emirates provided that he
was legitimate, violated no moral rules, was not in bad faith or in violation of elementary fairness. Id.
205. Gruman, 78 N.W.2d at 379. The court cited cases from a score of jurisdictions that were in accord.
In the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding of In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1988), the
issue was the value of two agreements licensing the bankrupt to manufacture and market two kinds of aircraft,
Both contracts had clauses prohibiting assignability without the consent of the licensor. The trial court rules
that under Minnesota law the contracts had no value because the licensors could arbitrarily and irrationally
withhold consent. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
206. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 841 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). Accord Economy Rentals,
Inc. v. Garcia, 819 P.2d 1306 (N.M. 1991).
207. See Judgment of Feb. 22, 1968, Cass. civ. 3e, Recueil Dalloz [D.S. Jur.] (Fr.): see also VOYAME
Er AL., supra note 19, at 25.
208. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. International Harvester, 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979) (assessing
a case where a landlord refused to consent to sublease, but instead counter-offered to rescind the lease because
the property value had risen substantially). Abuse of right has been unsuccessfully invoked in Louisiana
eviction cases, as well. See, e.g., G.L's Club of Slidell, Inc. v. American Legion Post # 374, 504 So. 2d 967
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Housing Authority v. Herbert, 387 So. 2d 693 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
209. 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984).
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was eligible for entry only if the former employer "released his work visa."
Oceanic refused to supply such a release. Plaintiff brought an action for tortious
interference with a contract. The lower court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
plaintiff had failed to show any duty on the part of Oceanic to provide a release.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiff
to amend his complaint to allege that Oceanic had abused its right not to provide
a release, and, alternatively, that a duty existed under Emirate law to provide the
necessary release. The doctrine of abuse of rights, as applied to these facts, was
framed in the following fashion:
Also, even if Oceanic had the right afforded by laws of the United Arab
Emirates, not to consent to plaintiff's employment with Scimitar, the
exercise of that right, without any benefit to Oceanic ... might constitute
an actionable abuse of rights which would support an award of
damages.21°
B. Franchises, Dealerships and Distributorships
In Walner v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.,211 the court expressed the
classical view of a franchisor's power to disapprove the assignment of a fran-
chise. "Once it is established that [the franchisor] possessed the right to disap-
prove a transfer, contract law permits [the franchisor] to exercise that right
without regard to good faith or motive."2 2 This view has been challenged.
In Larese v. Creamland Dairies, Inc.,213 a franchise agreement provided that
it could not be assigned without the consent of the franchisor.1 4 Acting under this
provision, the franchisor refused to consent to the franchisee's sale of the busi-
ness. It argued that its right to withhold consent was absolute. The court
disagreed, holding that the franchisor had a duty to act in good faith and in a com-
mercially reasonable manner. A contrary result could be reached only by the
implication of a covenant that the franchisor could withhold consent in bad faith
and unreasonably. The court refused to pass on the hypothetical question of the
effect of a provision "expressly granting the right to withhold consent unrea-
sonably."21
5
210. Id. at 94.
211. 514F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
212. Id. at 1031.
213. 767 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1985).
214. Id. at 717.
215. Id. at 718; accord Dunfee v. Baskin Robbins, 720 P.2d 1148, 1153-54 (Mont. 1986). Contra
Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that there is no
room for the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when contract language on the issue of relocation is clear).
See also Morrison v. International Harvester Co., 204 F. Supp. 6 (D. Colo. 1962), appeal dismissed, 306 F.2d
492 (10th Cir. 1962). The dealership contract contained an express nonassignability clause. Nonetheless, the
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C. Analogous Cases of Withheld Consent
There are other cases in which a contract obligates a party to refrain from
otherwise rightful conduct without the consent of the other. Perhaps typical is
Castle v. McKnight.2t6 A ranch owned by two brothers, containing internal fences,
was divided between them by agreement. The boundary lines were not marked
by fences. One of the brothers sold some of his portion to third parties who
requested and obtained an agreement from the brothers to the effect that neither
the brothers nor the purchasers would move fences near the boundary lines
without the consent of the other party. The agreement made it clear, however, that
the parties recognized that the fences did not mark the boundaries. Some years
later, a successor in interest to the purchasers decided to erect new fences at the
boundary line to take advantage of forty-four acres of pasture. After formal
negotiation with the brothers, their consent was not obtained. The trial judge ruled
that there was no limitation on the right of the brothers to withhold consent. The
Supreme Court of New Mexico disagreed. Since the contract was silent as to the
question of reasonableness of the withholding of consent, the court adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts' approach to omitted terms, stating "if a
contract is silent as to the manner of performance, 'a term which is reasonable in
the circumstances is supplied by the court.', 217 The technique of implying a
covenant of reasonableness is not dissimilar to the implication of a covenant of
good faith. On the margins, however, an unreasonable determination may be
made in good faith because the standard is objective rather than subjective.
Among the justifications for implying a covenant of reasonableness, however,
was a rationale normally associated with the covenant of good faith: "Neither
party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract."2
One could greatly multiply examples in this category of "analogous cases of
withheld consent." However, this paper will merely mention cases cited by the
manufacturer was notified of the proposed assignment, participated in the negotiations and found the proposed
buyers to be satisfactory. Later, but before the assignment was effectuated, it decided that no dealer was needed
at that location. It was held liable for interfering with the contract between its dealer and the prospective
purchaser. The court was able to characterize the manufacturer's conduct as a waiver of the nonassignability
clause. Id. at 7-8; see also Anthony Pools, A Division of Anthony Industries, Inc. v. Charles & David, Inc.,
797 S.W.2d 666, 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (denying error where consent had been given in writing, but the
scope of it had been subsequently drastically limited; an action by the franchisee for interference with a
contract was allowed).
216. 866 P.2d 323 (N.M. 1993).
217. Id. at 326; see id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACrs § 204 (1981)).
218. Id. at 326; see id. (quoting Economy Rentals, Inc. v. Garcia, 112 N.M. 748, 759 (1991), which
quoted Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 842 (Cal. 1985)). The ultimate source of the quotation
appears to be Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933). In Kirke La Shelle, the
quoted sentence concludes with the clause, "which means that in every contract there exists an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 167.
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court to buttress its opinion. The Castle court quoted dictum from an Iowa
decision that one principle of contract construction provides that "a contract will
not be interpreted as giving discretion to one party in a manner which would put
one party at the mercy of another.
21 9
In one of the cited cases in point, a separation agreement provided that the
wife would not remove property from the husband's house without his consent. -
When he refused to give his consent, she sued for conversion. Once again, a trial
court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, it was held that the denial of consent
could not be arbitrary. This was held both on the grounds of interpreting the
probable intent of the parties and of implying terms for the purpose of doing
equity. Abuse of rights analysis leads to the same result. Despite his property
rights and his contractual privilege to withhold consent, his act of depriving his
wife access to her property was an abusive exercise of those rights; whatever
purpose the contractual clause was designed for, it was not to deprive her
perpetually from possession of her personal property.
VIII. ABUSIVE TERMINATIONS OF CONTRACTS
A. Scope of the Topic
As used here, "termination" is restricted to the ending of a contractual
relationship by exercise of a power expressly provided in the contract other than
for breach. 22' A termination clause may require so little notice as to be uncon-
scionable as of the time the contract is made. 22 This is not the concern of this
paper. Rather, we will examine some cases to see if courts sanction abusive
terminations. It has long been the law of South Carolina that an actionable wrong
is committed "if the manner of termination is contrary to equity and good con-
science."3 Similarly, a Nevada court has ruled that a public contract containing
a provision that it could be terminated for the convenience of the county is subject
to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.22 4 Contrariwise, a court
applying the law of Idaho has ruled that good faith is not relevant where the
219. Castle, 866 P.2d at 326; see id. (quoting Iowa Fuel & Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Board of Regents,
471 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 1991)).
220. Clayburgh v. Clayburgh, 218 N.Y.S. 457 (App. Div. 1926).
221. This is consistent with the definition of "termination" in U.C.C. § 2-106.
222. Ashland Oil Co. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433,440 (W. Va. 1976); see also U.C.C. § 2-309(3). But
see Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
938 (1979).
223. deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971); see id. (citing
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire Stores, 159 S.E. 825 (S.C. 1931), and Gaines W. Harrison &
Sons v. J.I. Case Co., 180 F. Supp. 243 (E.D.S.C. 1960)).
224. A.C. Shaw Constr. v. Washoe County, 784 P.2d 9, 9-10 (Nev. 1989).
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contract contains an express termination clause.225 The law is in flux in this area
and shockingly, U.C.C. § 2-309 is not even noticed in many cases in which it
clearly or arguably provides the governing rule.?6 A comment in the Louisiana
Law Review, after reviewing the cases, urges the Louisiana courts to apply the
doctrine of abuse of rights to terminations that are in bad faith, or on short
notice.27 The argument is moot in the many jurisdictions where the legislature
has stepped in with franchising legislation to regulate terminations and non-
renewals of franchises thus rectifying the inadequacy of the common law
decisions?28
B. Abusive Insurance Terminations
Several days before the great Chicago fire of October 8-10, 1871, the plaintiff
obtained fire insurance coverage from the defendant. The policy was terminable
on notice and on the return of the premium. As the fire raged, an agent of the
company notified the plaintiff of termination of the policy and claimed to have
tendered the return of plaintiff's premium. The court upheld a judgment for the
plaintiff enforcing the insurance policy, saying, "[i]t cannot be claimed that an
insurer against fire can, when the fire is approaching the property insured, cancel
the policy... Of what avail would it be, to take a policy against fire, to permit its
cancellation when the fire is approaching? 229
Today, the insurance termination or non-renewal problem that confronts the
insured most severely involves the health insurance policy. In Cataldie v.
Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co.,2 ° insured's dependent daughter had
brain cancer. She was covered by a non-group family policy that was terminable
by simply giving notice. The insurer, in effect terminated the policy by decreasing
coverage, and radically increasing the deductible and the premium. The court held
that the policy as originally written continued in effect. It was able to reach this
225. Triangle Mining Co., v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 753 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1985); see id. (involving a
mineral lease of phosphate bearing land and an obligation of the lessee to supply the lessor's requirements of
phosphate). In Triangle Mining Co., though, no one seemed to think that the U.C.C. had any relevance to this
mixed mineral lease and requirements contract, even though footnote 5 of the opinion noted that several cases
have held that the good faith requirement of the U.C.C. does not limit the exercise of a termination clause.
Apparently such a clause, in the courts opinion, creates an absolute power. Id. at 740.
226. But see STO Corp. v. Henrietta Building Supplies, Inc., 609 N.Y.S.2d 746,747 (App. Div. 1994)
(stating that "[a]bsent an agreement with respect to the duration of their relationship, either party was at liberty
to terminate the distributorship at any time upon reasonable notification to the other (see U.C.C. 2-309 [2],
[3]).").
227. Pannal A. Sanders, Comment, "At Will" Franchise Terminations and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine:
The Maturation of Louisiana Law, 42 LA. L. REv. 210 (1981).
228. See 1 GLADYS GLICKMAN, FRANCHIStNG 9.03[14][b] (Gary I. Cohen ed. 1994).
229. Home Insurance Co. v. Heck, 65 Il. 111, 114 (1872).
230. 456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984).
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conclusion on the basis of a provision of a Louisiana statute. In so doing however,
it surveyed the law in the other states, stating:
When confronted with this type of situation all modem authorities we
have found conclude that the policy cannot be terminated as to illness,
injury or condition arising before the insurer's cancellation. They differ
only as to the theory of the decision: Ambiguity-Sparks v. Republic
National Life Insurance Co., [647 P.2d 1127 (Ariz. 1982), cert. den. 459
U.S. 1070] (cancellation of medical benefits policy); Public Policy-
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mississippi, 427 So. 2d 139
(Miss. 1983) (cancellation of medical benefits); Gulf Guaranty Life
Insurance Co. v. Kelley, 389 So. 2d 920 (Miss. 1980) (attempted
cancellation of credit life policy following insured's heart attack);
Detrimental Reliance-Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Robison, 54 F. 580
(C.A. Iowa) aff'd 58 F.723 (8th Cir. 1893); Implied Covenant of Good
Faith- Spindle v. Travelers Insurance Co., 136 Cal.Rptr. 404, 66
Cal.App.3d 951 (2d Dist. 1977) (cancellation of medical malpractice
policy). Reasonable Expectations of Insured Honored-See, Keeton
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV.
See also, Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v. Turner, 43 Ala.
App. 542, 195 So. 2d 807 (Ala. App. 1966) (pregnancy benefits payable
despite prior cancellation of group hospital and medical expenses policy);
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dove, 167 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942) (cancellation of health benefits not operative as to benefits
for continuing illness). Dossey v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 177
So. 427 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1937) (right to cancel life, health, and accident
policy suspended as per insurance contract for disability existing at
notice of cancellation); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, [18 Ga.App.
494, 89 S.E. 633 (1916)].
These theories involve many of the considerations which we would
employ in deciding such a case as this under the abuse rights doctrine.
See e.g., Cueto-Rua, "Abuse of Rights," 35 LA. L. REv. 965 (1975);
Comment, 42 LA.L.REV. 210 (1981). Since we have concluded that our
decision is governed by the contract and statutory law, there is no need
for us to consider that doctrine in this case. 21
If, as Karl Llewellyn taught, the right decision in a case where the facts are
uncontroverted is '.immanent,"3 2 the various courts that have passed on the
231. Id. at 1376-77.
232. KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 122 (1960).
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termination of insurance policies after the insured is stricken with a critical
medical condition have found the right answer. The right answer is then shored
up by the most variegated reasoning. An overt acceptance of a doctrine of abuse
of rights would provide sound grounds for such holdings2 
3
"Claims made" professional errors and omissions policies are common. They
cover only those claims that are made against the insured for the life of the policy
regardless of when the alleged tortious act occurred or when the injury ensued.
In Heen & Flint Associates v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 4 a mine exploded,
resulting in death and destruction. The insured, an engineering partnership,
notified the insurer that the situation potentially would result in claims, but no
claims were made during the policy period and the insurer refused to renew the
policy. Despite the general availability of retroactive coverage, no other insurer
would write coverage for the partnership without specifically excluding coverage
for any liability stemming from the mine explosion. The court points out that only
one of many cases in the United States had held that a policy that limits coverage
to "claims made" to be against public policy and that the rest upheld such policies
on the ground that retroactive coverage was availableY 5 After aligning itself with
the majority, the court ruled that the contract was unconscionable because the
insurer refused to renew and no other insurer would accept the retroactive risk.
The court quoted the unconscionability provision of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts which requires that unconscionability be viewed from the vantage point
of the time of making the contract, not from the time of performance.2 36 Yet the
court's reasoning seems to view the subsequent conduct of the insurer as the
unconscionable event. A theory of abuse of right supplies a rationale that is
sounder. If the exercise of a right is unconscionable, it is abused. Unconscion-
ability is best left in its role of policing the contract terms ex ante.
More clear cut cases of abuse of rights can hardly be imagined. There is no
doctrine in the library of classical or neoclassical contract law to explain the
233. Insurance experts might disagree that such holdings are sound. One writes, "[iln accident and
sickness insurance, to take one example, cancelable policies are written at premium rates considerably below
those for noncancelable policies." FRANK J. ANGELL, INSURANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 61 (1959)
(emphasis in original).This information, however, is available to actuaries and rarely to insureds. Our expert,
however, continues, "a few companies apparently are abusing this [cancellation] privilege." Id. Another text
defending the difference between cancelable and noncancellable policies, based on cost, notes that "the loss
of health insurance at the time when it is most needed might be a serious financial blow." EMiMETrJ. VAUGHAN
& CURTIS M. ELuOTr, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 248 (1978); see id. (discussing in the context
of a refusal to renew rather than termination of a policy).
234. 400 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1977).
235. Id. at 997; see id. (quoting from Jones v. Continental Casualty Co., 303 A.2d 91 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1973)). In Jones, the court stated "[c]learly the policy provisions in effect inhibit freedom of contract.
In order for plaintiff to maintain coverage or have continuity of coverage, he must continue to have defendant
as the insurance carrier. Such provisions do inhibit freedom of action in this field." Jones, 303 A.2d at 94.
236. Heen & Flint Assocs., 400 N.Y.S.2d at 998; see id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 (1981)). The actual citation was to § 234 of the tentative draft, which has been renumbered
in the final document.
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results in these cases, although one may always trot out "public policy" or "bad
faith" as the horse on which to saddle it. An overt doctrine of abuse of rights
would be a much more satisfactory explanation.
In Murphy v. Seed-Roberts Agency, Inc.,237 the insurer issued three-year
policies with a 90-day termination clause. The insurer sent out notices of termi-
nation, allegedly on the grounds that it wanted to reissue the policies at a higher
rate of premium. The insureds brought an action. The court ruled that summary
judgment for the insurer was improper. The insureds might be successful on any
one of three theories: (1) Parol evidence could show that the intent of the parties
was that there could be no termination except for cause; (2) evidence could be
adduced showing that the terminations were in bad faith;23 or (3) it might be
shown that the terminations were against public policy. This is a less clear cut
case of abuse of rights than the other insurance termination cases discussed
above. A court, using abuse of rights theory, would want to know the purposes
served by insurance termination clauses. There is likely an industry understanding
(whether or not known by the industry's customers) that would show what
purposes such clauses serve in the actuarial practices of the industry. If the
termination here was inconsistent with those purposes, the exercise of the
termination clause was abusive.
C. Abusive Acceleration of a Debt or Calling in a Demand Note
A bank promises a grocery business a line of credit of $3.5 million, fully
secured by inventory and accounts receivable. The agreement permits the bank
to call in the loan on demand. After a period of time, the business puts in its
requisition for $800,000, which would make the bank's exposure somewhat less
than $3.5 million. The bank refuses to advance the funds despite that, as con-
firmed by the bank's own audits, the loan was more than fully secured, despite
that no prior notice was given of the bank's intentions, and despite the bank's
knowledge that its refusal would doom the borrower's business. A jury verdict
for $7.5 million against the bank was upheld.239 The bank was aware that the
borrower's continued existence was entirely at the whim or mercy of the bank.
Therefore, good faith required either (a) prior notice of refusal to honor the line
237. 261 N.W.2d 198 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
238. Id. at 203. In a case with similar facts, the court held that an allegation that the cancellation was in
bad faith was sufficient to withstand a demurrer. Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 136 Cal. Rptr. 404,408 (Cal.
App. 1977).
239. K.M.C. Co., v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 766 (6th Cir. 1985); see id. (applying New York
law); see also Barbara A. Fure, Contracts as Literature: A Hermeneutic Approach to the Implied Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Loan Agreements, 31 DuQ. L. REv. 729 (1993) (arguing that such
results should be based on the reasonable expectations of the borrower rather than on the duty of good faith);
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes "Good Faith" under U.C.C. § 1-208 Dealing with "Insecure'" or
"At Will" Acceleration Clauses, 85 A.L.R. 4TH 284 (1991) (discussing related cases).
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of credit, or (b) a valid business reason, "some objective basis upon which a
reasonable loan officer in the exercise of his discretion would have acted in that
manner."240 Note that the "bad faith" of the bank did not consist of malice or an
intent to injure; its behavior was merely "an abuse of discretion," conduct that
was utterly unreasonable and inconsistent with standard banking practices.24'
It is noteworthy that on facts that were quite similar, the Supreme Court of
Canada reached the same result, applying the concept of abuse of rights under the
law of Quebec. 2 According to the court,
[ihe time has come to assert that malice or the absence of good faith
should no longer be the exclusive criteria to assess whether a contractual
right has been abused.... [T]here can no longer be a debate in Quebec
law that the less stringent standard of 'the reasonable exercise' of a right,
the conduct of the prudent and reasonable individual, as opposed to the
more stringent test of malice and the absence of good faith, can ground
liability resulting from an abuse of contractual rights.243
In Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell,244 Justice Scalia, in discussing the limitations of
the duty of good faith in contract performance or enforcement, stated in dictum
"[w]e cannot imagine, for example, entertaining a claim that a demand for pay-
ment of a demand note has been made 'in bad faith."' 245 But the jurisprudence of
"we recognize absolute rights when we see them" is precisely that which was
rejected in the two banking cases just discussed. A knowledge of commercial
practice is essential before such judgment can be made that the rights and obli-
gations created by a demand note are what is written on a piece of paper. The
240. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 761 (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 760.
242. Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122; see Rosalie Jukier, Case Comment,
Banque Nationale du Canada v. Houle (S.C.C.): Implications of an Expanded Doctrine of Abuse of Rights in
Civilian Contract Law, 37 McG.L L.J. 221 (1992). This Canadian case is complicated by the fact that the
action was by the shareholders of a family owned corporation, rather than the corporation itself. Before the
action was brought the shareholders had sold the corporation at a price considerably lower than might have
been obtained had the bank not taken the precipitous action that it took. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 122.
243. Houle, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 154-55.
244. 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
245. Id. at 1153. Some cases have so held. See, e.g., Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42,
46-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the imposition of a good-faith defense for payment of the demand note
transcends the performance or enforcement of the contract). See generally Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith,
Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 68 TOAS L. REV. 169 (1989) (discussing the meaning and application of demand notes and acceleration
clauses in loan agreements); Patricia A. Milon, Note, Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liability for Financial Institutions?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1197 (1987); Jay
M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes "Good Faith" under U.C.C. § 1-208 Dealing with "Insecure" or "At
Will" Acceleration Clauses, 85 A.L.R. 4TH 284 (1991 & Supp. 1994); Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Bank's
Liabilityfor Breach of Implied Contract of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4TH 1026 (1987 & Supp.
1994).
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attempt to catalog a priori the rights that are "absolute" seems doomed to failure,
and it should be so doomed. It is probably impossible to foresee how any parti-
cular right may be abused in such a way as to violate civilized norms, or, less
grandly, customary norms of commercial behavior.
Most of the cases under this heading exemplify the third category in the
Dutch restatement quoted above,246 that is, when a right "is exercised in circum-
stances in which, taking into account the interests served and those which are
harmed, no reasonable person would have decided to exercise it."
IX. BAD FAITH IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT
A. Meaning of "Contract Enforcement"
Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of
good faith in the "performance and enforcement" of any contract or duty gov-
erned by the Code, as does the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Although the
Code does not provide much guidance as to what is meant by good faith in
enforcement, a comment to the Restatement provides some guidance,247 and an
excellent law review article by Eric Andersen is a further guide.248 Enforcement
is frequently by litigation, but enforcement mechanisms may be agreed-upon
components of the contract itself. As Professor Andersen points out, a termination
clause may be "a device by which the parties' performance obligations may be
brought to an orderly conclusion," 249 or it may be an enforcement clause.
According to Andersen, in approaching the question of whether there has
been an abuse of an enforcement mechanism provided by contract, the first
question to ask is whether the contract term is an enforcement mechanism."°The
second question to ask is whether under the circumstances, the invocation of the
term will advance the purposes the term was intended to promote.25 It is abusive
if it (a) does not advance the purposes and serves purposes other than those it for
246. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
247. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACs §205 cmt. e (1981) (stating:
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing extends to the assertion, settlement and litigation
of contract claims and defenses.... The obligation is violated by dishonest conduct such as
conjuring up a pretended dispute, asserting an interpretation contrary to one's own understanding,
or falsification of facts. It also extends to dealing which is candid but unfair, such as taking
advantage of the necessitous circumstances of the other party to extort a modification of a contract
for the sale of goods without legitimate commercial reason .... Other types of violation have been
recognized in judicial decisions: harassing demands for assurance of performance, rejection of
performance for unstated reasons, willful failure to mitigate damages, and abuse of power to
determine compliance or to terminate the contract. (Cross references and citations omitted)).
248. Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOwA L. REv. 299 (1988).
249. Id. at 302.
250. Id. at 312.
251. Id.
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which it was designed, or (b) the invocation for a proper purpose could have been
avoided by reasonable steps the invoking party might have taken without pre-
judicing the party's own position.z2 Andersen's analysis is within the main
stream of abuse of rights theory.
B. Abusive Enforcement of Valid Covenants Not to Compete
Covenants not to compete ancillary to employment contracts are not favorites
of the law. They deprive the public of the competitive services of the employee.
Also, they frequently act harshly on the employee. There is no intent to discuss
here the many facets of the legal problems affecting such covenants. The topic
here is limited to the employee who has entered a valid covenant that meets the
tests of consideration and public policy and suffers from no infirmity such as
fraud. If such an employee is discharged without cause, will the covenant be
enforced? Would not such enforcement be unconscionably abusive? The answer
of classical contract law is that a valid contract exists and should be enforced. z 3
Yet, very many cases have employed flanking devices such as artful inter-
pretation, the exercise of equitable discretion, 55 and even by stretching the
252. This is a paraphrase of the elements of bad faith enforcement as stated by Andersen. See supra note
248, at 312.
253. See Torrington Creamery v. Davenport, 12 A.2d 780,782-83 (Conn. 1940) (enjoining the violation
of a covenant not to compete between a discharged manager and the new owners of a dairy creamery, but
finding significant the fact that the owners had requested that the manager be enjoined from competing only
in two towns); see also Robert S. Weiss & Assocs. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 222 (Conn. 1988)
(interpreting an employment contract which contained a covenant restricting the employee from engaging in
commercial business within a 15-mile radius for two years, and holding that upon expiration of the four-year
term of employment the covenant was activated); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Harris, 164 S.E.2d 727, 728-29
(Ga. 1968) (granting injunctive relief for violating a restrictive covenant, and concluding that "[t]hese
covenants (restrictive) on the part of the employee shall be construed as an agreement independent of any other
provision in this agreement, and the existence of any claim or cause of action of the employee against the
company whether predicated on this agreement or otherwise, shall not constitute a defense to the enforcement
by the Company of said covenants"); Gomez v. Chua Medical Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that where an at-will employment was terminated by the employer, the covenant would be enforced
even if the firing were "essentially arbitrary"); Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 215 A.2d 222, 225 (Md. 1965)
(discussing the rule that restrictive covenants not to compete will be enforced if the restriction is confined as
to area and duration within limits no wider than necessary to protect the business and without imposing undue
hardship on the employee or disregarding the interests of the public); Spaulding v. Mayo, 122 A. 899, 900
(N.H. 1923) (raising this issue but not answering it, as it was the employees, apparently at will, who quit and
entered into competition); Vermont Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 315 A.2d 456,458 (Vt. 1974) (saying of an
employee who voluntarily quit, "[h]e was not placed in the double bind of being both fired and subject to five
years of employment restraint.").
254. See Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1984) (construing a restrictive covenant strictly
and determining that it was unreasonable and unenforceable); Derrick, Stubbs & Stith v. Rogers, 182 S.E.2d
724, 726 (S.C. 1971) (holding that termination of the contract of employment also terminated the covenant).
Many covenants are written to prevent such a holding.
255. See Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 154 So. 2d 151, 155 (Miss. 1963) (stating that "[hiad
the chancellor found that appellant's discharge was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, he could have refused
to lend the aid of equity in enforcing the contract"); Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500,502-03 (Iowa
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equitable doctrine of "unclean hands.' z 6 Other courts basically have sputtered
that enforcement would be unjust.2 7 A recognized doctrine of abuse of rights
would explain why such a covenant will not be enforced by either law or equity
where the employee is discharged for the convenience of the employer. The
shared purpose of an employment agreement containing a covenant not to com-
pete is to protect the employer from conduct that is in the penumbra of unfair
competition while assuring the employee a means of practicing the trade or
profession for which the employee is trained. The employee's purpose in agreeing
to the covenant is to practice this trade or profession with the employer who has
now destroyed the assurance of a job while seeking to prevent the employee from
working at such a job elsewhere. Such enforcement would be a grave abuse of
rights.
C. Economic Waste in Enforcement
There is a recent federal common-law, cutting-edge case in the area of
economic waste and contract enforcement. In Granite Construction Co. v. United
States,258 the plaintiff agreed to construct a lock and a dam for the United States.
The lock and dam walls consist of concrete monoliths 60 feet high, 42 feet long
and 30 feet wide. Plaintiff was required to install PVC waterstop in the joints
between the monoliths. After approximately 10% of the waterstop had been
applied, the Corps of Engineers determined that the waterstop did not meet
contract specifications and required that the waterstop be removed and replaced.
Plaintiff filed a $3.8 million claim for the removal and replacement work. Under
1984) (holding that the cause for the termination was only one factor in determining whether an injunction
should issue); Security Services, Inc. v. Priest, 507 S.W.2d 592,595 (Tex. App. 1974) (noting that "equity may
deny enforcement of the covenant if the employer acts arbitrarily and unreasonably in discharging the
employee....").
256. See Chicago Towel Co. v. Reynolds, 152 S.E. 200, 201 (W. Va. 1930) (denying an injunction on
the basis of the "unclean hands" doctrine; the employee had been discharged without notice on the ground that
his salary was too high).
257. See Bailey v. King, 398 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ark. 1966) (explaining that "if an employer obtained an
agreement of this nature from an employee, and then, without reasonable cause, fired him, the agreement would
not be binding. In other words, an employer cannot use this type of contract as a subterfuge to rid himself of
a possible future competitor"); Post v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 397 N.E.2d 358, 361 (N.Y.
1979) (noting that "[w]here the employer terminates the employment relationship without cause, however, his
action necessarily destroys the mutuality of obligation on which the covenant rests as well as the employer's
ability to impose a forfeiture. An employer should not be permitted to use offensively an anticompetition clause
coupled with a forfeiture provision to economically cripple a former employee and simultaneously deny other
potential employers in his services"). The attempt to base the result on mutuality of obligation is like the
flailing of a non-swimmer. First, mutuality of obligation is an obsolete and abandoned doctrine. See CALAMARI
& PERiLLO, supra note 64, at § 4-12(c); CoitN, supra note 112, at ch. 6. Second, in the typical at-will
employment, there is no obligation on the employee, except perhaps the covenant itself. A theory of abuse of
rights is inherent in the rest of this quotation. In Dutch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher, 131 P.2d 630 (Wyo.
1942), the court said that the employer's conduct "savored with injustice." Id. at 636.
258. 962 F.2d 998 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 965 (1993).
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the contract, the government had the power to require the contractor to replace all
material which did not comply with the contract requirements, "unless in the
public interest, the Government consents to accept such material or workmanship
with an adjustment in the contract price." 59 The facts tended to show that the
waterstop that had been applied, although in violation of the specifications, was
more than adequate for the performance standards of the project by a factor of
twenty. They also demonstrated that the Corps had failed to consider the
contractor's offered alternative methods to improve the waterstopping strength
of the already installed material. Moreover, it was clear that the deviation from
the specifications was the fault of a supplier and not of the contractor; also, the
Corps had been remiss in exercising oversight during the time the non-con-
forming waterstop was applied. Relying on Judge Cardozo's opinion in Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,' ° and its progeny, the Federal Circuit held that the removal
and replacement of the waterstop involved economic waste and the contractor
was entitled to recover for the additional work.261
There is a considerable leap from the holding in Jacob to that of Granite
Construction. In the former case, the issues were whether (a) a condition should
be constructed, and (b) what would be the proper measure of damages-questions
of remedies. The answers to such questions are supplied by law and only to a
limited extent by the agreement of the parties.262 In Granite Construction, the
court was dealing with an agreement that required the contractor to comply with
the government's directives as to the method of cure and the contractor did in fact
comply with the directive.23 The Court held that the government's unreasonable
demand was an abuse of its right to administer the contract and therefore, entitled
the contractor to compensation?'
259. Id. at 1005.
260. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), reh'g denied, 130 N.E. 933 (N.Y. 1921).
261. 962 F.2d at 1007-08. See generally Hal J. Perloff, Comment, The Economic Waste Doctrine in
Government Contract Litigation, 43 DE PAULL. REv. 185,218-22 (1993) (discussing the Granite Construction
decision in the context of economic waste).
262. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 64, at 595-96 (referring to "the dubious assumption that
damages for breach of contract are based upon the contracting parties' implied or express promise to pay
damages in the event of a breach, rather than based upon a secondary duty imposed by law as a consequence
of the breach").
263. In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, the architect ordered the contractor to redo the piping work. The order
was not carried out. In denying rehearing, the court explained
The court did not overlook the specification which provides that defective work shall be replaced.
The promise to replace, like the promise to install, is to be viewed, not as a condition, but as
independent and collateral, when the defect is trivial and innocent. The law does not nullify the
covenant, but restricts the remedy to damages.
Jacobs & Young v. Kent, 130 N.E. 930,933 (1921).
264. Accord Toombs & Co., ASBCA Nos. 34590 et al., 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,403 at 117,433; 1990
WL 172728 (A.S.B.C.A.). Claim #IX in this case involved a contracting officer's order for the contractor to
remove and replace some metal boots at a location where return air ducts terminated on floor grilles. The boots
were in violation of specifications because they were bent; the contractor had failed to brace them adequately
while pouring concrete around them. The contractor refused, asserting correctly that the defects were not
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D. Abusive Cancellations for Breach
In Publicker Chemical Corp. v. Belcher Oil Co.,2 5 the contract for the storage
of oil provided that "[i]n the event either party shall default in the performance
of any obligation" that is not cured within fifteen days, the other party could
terminate the contract.26 Because of the declining storage price, the defendant
stood to save $2,500,000, if it could cancel the contract. Despite a "no offsets"
clause, the plaintiff unjustifiably withheld $4,800 for "agitation charges." The
defendant, after a fifteen day period, canceled the contract. The court, applying
Louisiana law, ruled that the cancellation was ineffective, saying "[t]ermination
of a $5 million dollar [sic] contract because of [a] $5,000 dispute, if not absurd,
is surely unreasonable."2 67 Rather than utilize the Louisiana theory of abuse of
rights, the court indulged in a frequently employed covert tool-artful inter-
pretation. It held that the default clause permitted cancellation only for failure to
perform a primary obligation. Such an interpretation made the clause meaningless
because Louisiana law permits cancellation for material breach even without such
a clause.m If a theory of abuse of rights were employed by the court, a less disin-
genuous explanation might have been given.
Other enforcement mechanisms permitted by the U.C.C., such as stoppage
in transit, have been faulted when used in an abusive way, for example: failing
to notify the buyer of stoppage of deliveries that were en route to Pennsylvania
from Norway and Japan.m Rejection of goods that fail to conform to the perfect
visible and had no effect on the air flow. The contracting officer withheld $20,000 as the cost of repair. It was
held that repair would have involved unreasonable economic waste and the contractor should be paid. Id.
265. 792 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1986).
266. Id. at 484 n.2 (emphasis added); see also Liza Company v. Mark Hellinger Theatre, Inc., 240
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (App. Div. 1963) (discussing an advertising clause which provided that "a violation of
this clause shall be considered a violation of the whole contract"); id. at 1006 (dismissing the fact that the
clause had been violated, and reasoning that the "[defendants] had already determined to end the theatre
agreement, and the claim of the advertising breach was also a mere afterthought seized upon by them in an
effort to justify a position which they had already assumed").
267. Publicker Chemical Corp., 792 F.2d at 487.
268. Not all civil law jurisdictions accept the idea that a contracting party can cancel for material breach.
See Joseph M. Perillo, Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and
a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281,306-08 (1994). Louisiana law does provide for such self help. LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2013 (West 1987).
269. Indussa Corp. v. Reliable Stainless Steel Supply Co., 369 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The judge
withdrew his earlier bench opinion to the effect that "I do consider it morally reprehensible that [seller] gave
no such notice to [buyer], and I would certainly hope that in similar situations in the future [seller's] corporate
conduct would be guided by proper moral principles." L at 983-84. Similarly, cancellation without prior
notice of a contract for specially manufactured goods, the production of which was overdue, was held to be
a violation of the duty of good faith. KLT Indus. v. Eaton Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Mich. 1981). This
can be seen as another abusive cancellation case.
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tender rule has been held to be a breach where the motive for the rejection was
to take advantage of falling market prices.27°
E. Abusive Bankruptcy
Although creditors may be injured when an obligor declares bankruptcy, such
injury is regulated by the Bankruptcy Act and generally the creditor has no legal
redress outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. In Pernet v. Peabody Engineering
Corp.,7' the plaintiff sold his business to a subsidiary of the defendant. In return,
the subsidiary promised to employ defendant for five years at a stated salary plus
commissions. The defendant parent corporation guaranteed the subsidiary's
obligations to the plaintiff in the event the subsidiary defaulted because of its sale,
merger, dissolution, or the like. Plaintiff was held to have stated a cause of action
by alleging that the defendant caused the bankruptcy of the subsidiary to deprive
the plaintiff of his employment rights. In other words, if defendant used its
management prerogatives in an abusive way so as to cause the subsidiary's
bankruptcy, it would be in violation of the agreement-even though the guaranty
did not apply to the risk of bankruptcy of the subsidiary.
In another case, the owner of undeveloped land defaulted on the mortgage.
The mortgagee brought an action to foreclose. The owner, who had no other
major assets, filed a petition for bankruptcy reorganization. Such a petition has
the effect of suspending the state court foreclosure action. The petition was sum-
marily dismissed as having been brought in bad faith since there was no prospect
of a successful reorganization. Although the multifaceted concept of good faith
was employed, the more targeted concept of abuse of rights provides a more
coherent explanation: It is a case of a right being employed for a purpose other
than that for which it was created.272
270. See T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d 932 (N.Y. 1982); Oil Country
Specialists, Ltd. v. Phillip Bros., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 170 (rex. Ct. App. 1988); see also Cambee's Furniture, Inc.
v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 175 (8th Cir. 1987) (cancellation for breach would, if merely
for a pretextual reason, violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); accord Neumiller Farms, Inc. v.
Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1979); Printing Ctr. of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W.2d
779 (rex. Ct. App. 1984).
271. 248 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div. 1964).
272. Matter of Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). See generally
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an
Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919 (1991).
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X. ABUSE OF RIGHTS AS A CRIME
A. Blackmail
The paradox of blackmail has intrigued theorists of many schools of
thought.273 IfI am free to reveal to my neighbor's wife that her husband is having
an affair, and if I am equally free to keep this information a secret, and if I am
also free to sell this information to a newspaper or other medium of information,
or gossip about it with my friends and acquaintances, why then is it a crime to
make a bargain with the husband to keep this information secret' 4 An answer
is that it is an abuse of my freedoms of speech and silence. James Lindgren
explains it best: the blackmailer is seeking an advantage by threatening the victim
with the wife's power to end the marital relationship or otherwise react negatively
to the husband's infidelity. 275 Similarly, where a blackmailer who has information
about criminal conduct threatens to go to the police or prosecutor with that
information unless the blackmail victim pays him $10,000, the blackmailer is
using the power of the state for his own financial gain. 'Thus when a blackmailer
threatens to turn in a criminal unless paid money, the blackmailer is bargaining
with the states's chip. 276 Lindgren points out that blackmail, bribery, payola,
insider trading, and commercial bribery have a common thread. The criminal uses
the resources or power of another for the criminal's own benefit. He describes
this use of public leverage as a "misuse. ' 277 This analysis falls well within a
theory of abuse of rights. Our legal system, indeed the Constitution, assures us of
freedom to speak and freedom to be silent. One could enumerate numerous
purposes these freedoms serve.278 But freedom to bargain away, for private gain,
our right to give information to the police or to the prosecution is not among these
purposes. If the bargain is initiated by the person having the harmful information,
the crime is blackmail. If the initiative comes from the party who is fearful of
prosecution, this party's crime may be conspiracy, obstruction of justice, or
273. See, e.g., Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1993); see also James Lindgren,
Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1975 (1993) (summarizing the different views on the reasons for
criminalizing blackmail); Peter Alldridge, 'Attempted Murder of the Soul': Blackmail, Privacy and Secrets,
13 OxFoRD J. O PLEGAL STUD. 368 (1993) (expressing an additional view).
274. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962) is entitled "Theft by Extortion" and includes what is commonly
known as "blackmail." It provides, in part, that "[a] person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property
of another by threatening to: ... expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute .... Id.
275. See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141
U. PA. L REV. 1695, 1705-08 (1993).
276. Id. at 1706.
277. Id. at 1707; see id. (quoting James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 670,702-03 (1984)).
278. See LAuRENcE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing free
trade in ideas, an essential tool in self-government, individual dignity, and autonomy).
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compounding a felony. No matter which of the crimes has been committed, the
party who has been promised payment for silence cannot enforce the bargain.
279
B. Obstruction of Justice
Anyone is free to communicate with a prosecutor to argue that leniency be
afforded a defendant. However, when a social acquaintance of the prosecutor
recommends leniency towards a convicted drug dealer, lying about his own
motives he is guilty of obstruction of justice. According to United States v.
Mitchellas the gravamen of the offense in the obstruction of justice case dis-
cussed, was the "use of otherwise legitimate arguments for concealed orfalsfied
ends.
, 282
Thus, where Mitchell and others attempted to influence the S.E.C.'s
investigation into the activities of Robert Vesco, "while concealing the purported
motive for those efforts," their conduct constituted an obstruction of justice.283
Once again, we see the paradox of behavior that is lawful per se, becoming
unlawful when exercised for improper purposes. Other examples of this paradox
exist elsewhere in the criminal law. 284 These paradoxes are explained by the
semantic oxymoron called abuse of rights.
279. See 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1421 (1962).
280. United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1941); see id. (concealing the fact that he was to
receive $500 for his efforts to assist the defendant, and lying about a local politician's interest in the case and
about his business relationship with the drug dealer).
281. 372 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1973).
282. Id. at 1251 (emphasis in original); see id. (quoting Polakoff, 121 F.2d at 333).
283. Id. at 1254; see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (involving a
conspiracy to induce the CIA to prevail upon the FBI to halt its investigation of the Watergate incident).
284. There is a line of cases under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343, which prohibit mail and wire fraud,
involving public officials who did what they were entitled to do but did it for improper motives; the motives
combined with the failure to disclose those motives were what made their acts criminal. This line has come to
an abrupt end, based on statutory construction. McNalley v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Citations to
this line of cases can be found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens. Id. at 362. Other expressions of
Justice Stevens, consistent with a doctrine of abuse of rights, include his dissent in Town of Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,411 (1987). The plaintiffhad been arrested on state charges. An agreement was reached
whereby charges would be dropped in exchange for his release of all claims for any harm caused by his arrest.
He subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against the town and its officers for the alleged
violation of his constitutional rights. The court held that the action was barred by the release, which the trial
court had held to be voluntary. Stevens, in dissent, wrote that "a defendant who is required to give up such a
claim in exchange for a dismissal of a criminal charge is being forced to pay a price that is unrelated to his
possible wrongdoing as reflected in that charge." Id. at 412. In short, the prosecutor was using his power to
keep the plaintiff in jail as a bargaining chip for the desired release. "The public," Stevens asserts, "is entitled
to have the prosecutor's decision to go forward with a criminal case, or to dismiss it, made independently of
his concerns about the potential damages liability of the Police Department." Id.
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XI. MISCELLANEOUS CASES OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Abuse of rights has been the overt basis for decisions in the patent and copy-
right fields.2 The doctrine is well known in international law.M Numerous cases
in which equitable discretion is exercised to refuse specific performance could be
analyzed to show their consistency with abuse of rights theory.87 The world of
corporate law is a ripe candidate for abuse of rights analysis, as minority share-
holders sometimes successfully protect their interests in court against the majority
shareholders.2sa The doctrine of "business purpose" in tax law is another context
in which such analysis works. Not surprisingly, there is no similar doctrine in
England-still a bastion of the absolute nature of property and contract rights.289
Most especially ripe for abuse of rights analysis are cases of the abuse of govern-
mental power in the administrative process.
Let me close this "Miscellaneous" category with a mention of a case under
the Homestead Act. The defendant in a criminal prosecution had entered upon
forested land, staked a Homestead claim, and clear-cut an acre. The logs were
taken to a sawmill where they were allegedly sold. The land belonged to the
United States and title would vest in the homesteader after five years of culti-
vation. Another statute prohibited the cutting of trees on "lands of the United
States," except for use by the Navy. The court, in upholding a charge to the jury
that the cutting of timber on Homestead land for purposes of sale violated the
statute, stated that during the five year period:
285. See, e.g., Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). In Lasercomb
America, the plaintiff licensed a copyrighted software package for use in die-making. The license contained
a provision obligating the licensee not to produce or sell computer-assisted die-making software of any kind.
Defendant licensee produced and marketed infringing software. Held: the action for infringement is dismissed.
"Misuse of copyright" is a defense to infringement by analogy to "misuse of patent" defense. Id. at 978. See
generally Marshall Leaffer, Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv.
1087 (1994).
286. See 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1984); see also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCiPLEs OFPUBLICINTERNATIONALLAW 444-46 (4th ed. 1990).
287. See, e.g., McDowell v. Biddison, 87 A. 752, 756 (Md. 1913) (commenting that "[i]f to enforce
specifically an agreement would do one party great injury and the other but comparatively little good, so that
the result would be more spiteful than just, the chancellor will not require its execution" (quoting
McCuteheon's Heirs v. Rawleigh, 76 S.W. 50, 51 (Ky. 1903))); see also Brooks v. Towson Realty, Inc., 162
A.2d 431 (Md. 1960). In Brooks, vendor would not sell one of two parcels separate from the other. Purchaser
acquiesced but asked that the agreement be in two separate contracts with a very low price expressed in one
and a high price for the second parcel, explaining that this would be helpful to the purchaser's income tax
liability. Vendor acquiesced and two contracts were made. Purchaser terminated the high price contract
pursuant to a clause permitting termination if unrestricted title insurance could not be obtained and sought
specific performance of the low price contract. This relief was granted only on the condition that both contracts
be performed. Id. at 432-37.
288. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975 (Del. 1977) (stating that "Delaware case'law
clearly teaches that even complete compliance with the mandate of a statute does not, in every case, make the
action valid in law:).
289. See Ward et al., supra note 2; Ward & Cullity, supra note 2.
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[S]uch settler had the right to treat the land as his own, so far, and so far
only, as is necessary to carry out the purposes of the act. The object of
this legislation is to preserve the right of the actual settler, but not to open
the door to manifest abuses of such right. Obviously the privilege of
residing on the land for five years would be ineffectual if he had not also
the right to build himself a house, outbuildings, and fences, and to clear
the land for cultivation and to that extent the [Homestead] act modifies
the act of 1831.... It is equally clear that he is bound to act in good faith
to the government, and that he has no right to pervert the law to dishonest
purposes, or to make use of the land for profit or speculation. (Emphasis
added).2 90
This quotation is not a mere linguistic coincidence with the creation of the
doctrine of abuse of rights in France decades earlier. Despite many divergences
between the conceptual frameworks of the common law of the United States and
the codified law of nineteenth century France, there has been much intellectual
interchange between the two countries. I do not suggest an interchange that
contained a dialogue on the concept of abuse of rights, although that is not impos-
sible.29' Just as there was a concurrent development of the notion of the absolute
nature of rights in the common and civil law,292 though, there has also been a
gradual but concurrent abandonment of such notions of absolutism in the two
systems. This erosion of absolutism continues.
XII. CONCLUSION
This paper does not favor the wholesale importation of a doctrine of abuse of
rights from abroad. Rather, it favors the recognition of a concept that can be con-
structed from cases, doctrines, and statutes indigenous to the United States.
Doubtless, there will be those who will consider that such a concept introduces
uncertainty into the law. All equitable doctrines, to some extent, increase the
law's uncertainty. Long ago, Francis Bacon addressed this issue: "But to this Ob-
jection it may be answered in general that where Conscience is to direct the
Judge, that Court cannot with any Propriety of Sense or Speech, be said to be
290. Shiver v. United States, 159 U.S. 491,497 (1895).
291. Professor Yiannopoulos traces the French doctrine of abuse of the rights of ownership to the
treatises of Domat and Pothier. Yiannopoulis, supra note 2, at 1175. These pre-Napoleonic treatises were well.
known in the United States. A Westlaw search for Domat in the SMr-OLD database turns up 57 cases and case
briefs citing to Domat. Pothier is also cited with some frequency. Because of the appearance of many
references to other individuals surnamed Pothier in this database, no count has been made.
292. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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arbitrary. The Judge knows and is sensible that he sits there, not to dictate
according to his Will and Pleasure, but to be guided by that infallible Monitor
within his own Breast; and surely he who is bound to determine according to the
original and eternal Rules of Justice; is no more arbitrary, then he that is bound
to judge according to positive Laws and Statutes .. ."293
293. SIR FRANCIS BACON, MAXIMS OF EQUrrY I (the second of two pages numbered 1 in the 1978 photo
reprint of a 1727 printing) (1623).

